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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
“War is essentially an evil thing. Its consequences are not confined to the belligerent States 
alone, but affect the whole world. To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an 
international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war 
crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.” – Nuremberg 
Judgment1  
 
1.1. Background 
 
Over seventy years ago, in 1946, the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg 
came to the conclusion cited above: that aggression is the supreme international crime 
and ‘the accumulated evil of the whole’. That same year, the principles of international 
law elaborated in the Nuremberg judgment were confirmed by the United Nations 
General Assembly.2 Still, since World War II no one has been punished for the crime 
of aggression, which for a long time remained un-defined and un-codified in 
international law.3 Even though the Nuremberg Tribunal had condemned aggression 
with powerful words, States would spend decades before agreeing on definitions for 
the concept of aggression and the crime of aggression.4 In December 1974 the United 
Nations General Assembly passed a resolution containing a definition for aggression.5 
It provides that aggression is ‘the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner 
                                                 
 I am grateful to Dr Erkki Kourula, former Judge at the International Criminal Court, and Dr Marja 
Lehto at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland for giving me a valuable opportunity to follow and 
participate in the negotiations on the crime of aggression in 2005-2007 during my internship at the 
Court and my employment at the Ministry. It sparked an interest that continues to inspire me. 
1 United States of America et al. v. Goering et al., International Military Tribunal, Judgment (30 
September – 1 October 1946) at 186 
2 Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognised by the Charter of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, GA Res. 95 (I) (11 December 1946)  
3 Giorgio Gaja, ‘The Long Journey towards Repressing Aggression’ in Cassese, Antonio; Gaeta, Paola 
and Jones John R.W.D. (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary 
(Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002) (hereinafter referred to as the Cassese Commentary) at 427 
4 William Schabas, ‘The Unfinished Work of Defining Aggression: How Many Times Must the 
Cannonballs Fly, Before They Are Forever Banned’ in McGoldrick, Dominic; Rowe, Peter and 
Donnelly, Eric (eds.), The Permanent International Criminal Court: Legal and Policy Issues (Hart 
Publishing: Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2004) at 127 
5 Definition of Aggression, GA Res. 3314 (XXXIX), 14 December 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the 
‘Definition of Aggression’) 
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inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations’.6 However, the General Assembly 
resolution only defined State acts of aggression, it did not provide a definition for the 
crime of aggression, for which individuals can be held criminally liable. In comparison 
with the prosecutions of individuals for aggression after World War II, it fell short.7  
 
With the re-emergence of international criminal justice in the 1990’s8 and efforts 
towards establishing a permanent international criminal court there was a new interest 
in trying to define the crime of aggression. The 1994 ILC Draft Statute for an 
International Criminal Court envisioned that a future permanent international criminal 
court would have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. However, the International 
Law Commission (hereinafter also ILC) suggested that the future court could 
commence proceedings on a crime of aggression only if the United Nations Security 
Council (hereinafter ‘Security Council’ or ‘UNSC’) had made a previous determination 
that a State had committed an act of aggression.9 In the commentary to the draft, the 
ILC held that ‘criminal responsibility of an individual for an act or crime of aggression 
necessarily presupposes that a State had been held to have committed aggression, and 
such a finding would be for the Security Council acting in accordance with Chapter VII 
of the Charter of the United Nations to make’.10 This followed from Articles 24 and 39 
of the Charter of the United Nations, according to which the Security Council has 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and is 
entrusted with the competence to determine the existence of an act of aggression.11 
States, however, had differing views on the envisaged role of the Security Council in 
relation to the future court and its jurisdiction.12 
                                                 
6 Article 1, Definition of Aggression  
7 For a summary of trials relating to the crime of aggression after World War II held in Nuremberg, 
Tokyo, and under Control Council No.10 in Germany, see: Historical review of developments relating 
to aggression, Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, 
PCNICC/2002/WGCA/L.1 
8 In particular, by the establishment of the two ad hoc tribunals ICTY and ICTR and the intensified 
negotiations and subsequent agreement on the Rome Statute in 1998. 
9 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court 1994 with commentaries, Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, 1994, vol. II (Part Two), draft Articles 20(b) and 23(2) 
10 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court 1994 with commentaries, Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, 1994, vol. II (Part Two) at 44 
11 Articles 24 and 39, Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco, 26 June 1945, in force 24 October 
1945, The United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, California, April 
26 to June 26, 1945: Selected Documents (United States Department of State: Washington, 1946) xv, 
and 335; amendments by General Assembly Resolutions in United Nations Treaty Series 557, 143/638, 
308/892, 119, 173 
12 Strapatsas, Nicolaos, ’The Practice of the Security Council Regarding the Concept of Aggression’, in 
Kreβ, Claus and Barriga, Stefan (eds.), The Crime of Aggression: A Commentary (Cambridge 
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The negotiations on a permanent international criminal court continued in the Ad Hoc 
Committee in 1995, in the Preparatory Committee in 1996-199813, and finished with 
the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (hereinafter also 
referred to as the ‘Rome Statute’ or where appropriate, the ‘Statute’) at the Rome 
Conference in 1998.14 The negotiations failed to resolve the issues relating to the crime 
of aggression, even though States generally agreed to have the crime within the ICC’s 
jurisdiction.15 States were in disagreement over the definition of the crime of aggression 
and on what role to give to the Security Council, if any.16 
 
As the support of certain States for the International Criminal Court (hereinafter also 
referred to as ‘ICC’ or where appropriate, ‘the Court’) was dependent on whether the 
crime of aggression was within the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction, a careful 
compromise was placed into the Rome Statute.17 In Article 5 the Court’s jurisdiction 
was limited to ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a 
whole’: the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of 
aggression.18 The definitions of the first three crimes are provided for in Articles 6, 7 
and 8 of the Statute, but no definition was included for the crime of aggression.19 Article 
5 was completed with paragraph 2, according to which the ICC would have jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression once a definition for it had been agreed upon. Thus, the 
ICC has de jure jurisdiction for the crime of aggression, e.g. the crime is within the 
                                                 
University Press: Cambridge, 2017) at 179 (hereinafter referred to also as the ‘Aggression 
Commentary’) 
13Establishment of an international criminal court, GA Res. 50/46, 11 December 1995 
14 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Rome, 17 July 1998, in force 1 July 2002, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), reprinted in 2187 United Nations Treaty Series 3854; amendments by 
resolution of the Review Conference on 10 June 2010 and resolution of the Assembly of States Parties 
to the International Criminal Court on 26 November 2015 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rome 
Statute’) 
15 William Schabas, ‘The Unfinished Work of Defining Aggression: How Many Times Must the 
Cannonballs Fly, Before They Are Forever Banned’ in McGoldrick, Dominic; Rowe, Peter and 
Donnelly, Eric (eds.), The Permanent International Criminal Court: Legal and Policy Issues (Hart 
Publishing: Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2004), at 134 – 135  
16 Alberto L. Zuppi, ‘Aggression as International Crime: Unattainable Crusade or Finally Conquering 
the Evil?, 26 Penn State International Law Review (2007) 1-36 
17 Gaja in Cassese Commentary supra note 3 at 431 
18 Article 5(1), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Rome, 17 July 1998, in force 1 July 
2002, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), reprinted in 2187 United Nations Treaty Series 3854; 
amendments by resolution of the Review Conference on 10 June 2010 and resolution of the Assembly 
of States Parties to the International Criminal Court on 26 November 2015 (hereinafter referred to as 
the ‘Rome Statute’) 
19 Articles 6,7 and 8 of the Rome Statute  
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scope of the Court, but the Court is impaired from exercising this jurisdiction de facto 
until a definition of the crime as well as the conditions to exercise jurisdiction for the 
crime have been agreed upon.20 This solution left the door open for a future definition 
of the crime of aggression, when States would be ready to agree on it.21  
 
Article 5(2) further specifies that such future provisions on aggression shall be 
‘consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations’.22 This 
was an implicit reference to the United Nations Security Council’s determination 
powers under Article 39 of the Charter.23 This is why Article 5(2) envisaged that States 
would have to agree on specific ‘conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction’ for the 
crime of aggression – as opposed to simply applying the jurisdictional provisions that 
they had agreed on for the three other crimes in the Rome Statute. In this regard, States 
disagreed on whether determining the existence of an act of aggression is an exclusive 
or primary power of the Security Council, and whether that affects the ICC’s 
competence to adjudge on the crime of aggression. States had to agree on whether the 
ICC could exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression without a prior Article 39 
determination or a ‘green light’ given to the ICC by the Security Council.24 In essence, 
it was about accommodating between the political powers of the Security Council and 
the judicial powers of the ICC, without politicising the Court too much.  
 
The Final Act of the Rome Conference created a Preparatory Commission (hereinafter 
also referred to as the ‘PrepCom’) to among other things prepare for the future 
establishment of the ICC and continue the negotiations on aggression.25  The PrepCom 
was to prepare a proposal on the crime of aggression and submit it to the Assembly of 
States Parties to the International Criminal Court (hereinafter also ‘Assembly of States 
                                                 
20 Andreas Zimmermann, ‘Article 5: Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court’, in Otto Triffterer 
(ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court – Observers’ Notes, Article 
by Article (2nd edition, CH Beck: München, 2008) at 135 (hereinafter the Triffterer Commentary).  
21 Schabas, Cannonballs, at 134 
22 Article 5, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, A/CONF.183/9, in force 1 
July 2002 (hereinafter ‘Rome Statute’) 
23 Zimmermann in Triffterer Commentary supra note 19 at 135 
24 Clark Roger S., ‘Rethinking Aggression as a Crime and Formulating Its Elements: The Final Work-
Product of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court’, Leiden Journal of 
International Law 15 (2002) 859-890 
25 Resolution on the Establishment of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, 
(Annex I of Resolution F), Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries 
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court A/CONF.183/10, 17 July 1998 (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘Resolution F of the Final Act’) 
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Parties or ‘ASP’) at a future Review Conference, ‘with a view at arriving at an 
acceptable provision on the crime of aggression.’26  
 
When the Prep Com came to an end after the establishment of the ICC, the negotiations 
on the crime of aggression continued in the Special Working Group on the Crime of 
Aggression (hereinafter also referred to as ‘Special Working Group’ or ‘SWGCA’) 
established by the Assembly of the States Parties. The group was open on an ‘equal 
footing’ to all Member States of the United Nations.27 Between 2003 and 2010 the 
Special Working Group met over ten times at the Assemblies of States Parties, at 
special resumed ASP meetings and at informal inter-sessional meetings held in 
Princeton. It elaborated proposals on the crime of aggression to the Review Conference 
of the Rome Statute (hereinafter also referred to as ‘Review Conference’) held in 
Kampala, Uganda in June 2010.28 Six decades after the Nuremberg judgment, on 10 
June 2010, States finally came to a milestone agreement on the definition of the crime 
of aggression and the ICC’s jurisdiction for the crime.29 
 
The provisions on the crime of aggression are deeply connected to the United Nations 
system of collective security, in particular the Security Council’s role in maintaining 
international peace and security. While States have different opinions on the extent of 
the primacy or exclusivity of the Security Council’s powers under Chapter VII, 
realpolitik required a compromise that would satisfy, or at least not completely 
ostracize, the permanent members of the Security Council. Therefore, the amendments 
to the Rome Statute include limits to the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression 
in Articles 15 bis and 15 ter.30 The provisions are woven into the current jurisdictional 
fabric of the ICC which is triggered by referrals by States Parties by the Court; referrals 
                                                 
26 Operative paragraph 7, Resolution F of the Final Act 
27 Assembly of States Parties to the International Criminal Court, Resolution ICC-ASP/1/Res.1, 10 
September 2002 (‘Continuity of work in respect of the crime of aggression’) 
Official records of the First Session of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court 3-10 September 2002 
28 Wenaweser, Christian, ‘Reaching the Kampala Compromise on Aggression: The Chair’s 
Perspective’, Leiden Journal of International Law, 23 (2010) 883-887 
29 Wenaweser, Christian, ‘Reaching the Kampala Compromise on Aggression: The Chair’s 
Perspective’, Leiden Journal of International Law, 23 (2010) 883-887 
30 Amendments on the crime of aggression to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
Kampala, 10 June 2010, not in force, Resolution RC/Res.6 of the Review Conference of the Rome 
Statute, available: https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/docs/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf, last visited 23 April 2017 
(hereinafter referred to as Resolution RC/Res.6) 
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by the UN Security Council; and proprio motu investigations by the Prosecutor of the 
Court. According to Article 15 ter when the Security Council has referred a situation 
concerning the crime of aggression to the ICC, no separate determination of the 
existence of an act of aggression is required by the Security Council. But where the 
Court acts without a Security Council referral, after a State Party referral or an 
investigation initiated by the Court’s Prosecutor, he or she must separately notify the 
Security Council and ascertain whether it has made a determination on aggression. If 
the Security Council does not act within six months after the notification, the ICC Pre-
Trial Chamber may authorize the Prosecutor to proceed with the investigation. 
According to the amendments, the determination of an act of aggression by the Security 
Council, or by any organ outside of the Court is ‘without prejudice to the Court’s own 
findings'.31  
 
With these amendments to the Rome Statute there are now two distinct regimes 
providing for international responsibility for aggression. There is an executive organ: 
the ‘world police’, the Security Council, still mandated to determine whether an act of 
aggression has taken place and what actions it will take following such a determination, 
be it sanctions or the use of force. Then there is a judicial organ: the ‘world criminal 
court’, the International Criminal Court, mandated to decide on the criminal liability of 
individuals responsible for aggression committed by States. The Security Council and 
the International Criminal Court may, and most likely will, engage on the same 
situations. Under their own separate regimes they may come to different conclusions as 
to whether an act of aggression has taken place. 
 
The Review Conference agreed that the amendments would enter into force in 
accordance with Article 121(5) of the Rome Statute, which provides that amendments 
to the definitions of the crimes in the Statute ‘shall enter into force for those States 
Parties which have accepted the amendment one year after the deposit of their 
instruments of ratification  or  acceptance.’.32 The amendment providing for the 
definition of the crime of aggression entered into force on 26 September 2012.33 The 
                                                 
31 (Article 15 bis (9) and Article 15 ter (4) of Resolution RC/Res.6 
32 Article 121(5) of the Rome Statute 
33 Amendment to article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Kampala, 10 June 
2010, in force 26 September 2012, Resolution RC/Res.5 of the Review Conference of the Rome 
Statute, reprinted in 2868 United Nations Treaty Series 195 
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amendments providing for the conditions to exercise jurisdiction is not yet in force.34 
According to Articles 15 bis and 15 ter their entry into force requires a separate decision 
by the States Parties of the Statute by a majority of seven-eights of the States Parties. 
at the earliest after 1 January 2017.35 The jurisdiction provisions have been ratified by 
33 States Parties to date.36 
 
1.2. Scope and aim of this study 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the consequence of these new jurisdictional 
provisions in the context of the relationship between the International Criminal Court 
and the United Nations Security Council. In particular, the purpose of this study is to 
examine whether the International Criminal Court would engage in judicial review of 
Security Council resolutions on aggression, now that the Court has become entwined 
with the Council’s determinations on aggression under article 39.  
 
In international law, judicial review is understood as the review of Security Council 
resolutions (and sometimes General Assembly resolutions) by international courts.  It 
is an examination or review conducted by a judiciary of the legality or consequences of 
acts of a legislative or executive body. The Charter of the UN does not directly 
empower any court with the power to review Security Council decisions. While some 
international courts have engaged in different forms of review or examination of 
Security Council resolutions, mainly due to questions arisen through litigation, no court 
has a similar jurisdictional relationship with the Security Council as the ICC does.  
 
Articles 15 bis and 15 ter provide that ‘[a] determination of an act of aggression by the 
Security Council shall be without prejudice to the Court’s own findings under the 
Statute’. This means that a determination on aggression by the Security Council, in the 
same situation that the ICC is examining, is not binding on the Court. According to 
article 15 bis the ICC may also make its own finding on aggression. It is clear that these 
                                                 
34 Amendments on the crime of aggression to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
Kampala, 10 June 2010, not in force, Resolution RC/Res.6 of the Review Conference of the Rome 
Statute, available: https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/docs/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf, last visited 23 April 2017 
35 Articles 15 bis and 15 ter, Resolution 6 
36 UN Treaty Series: https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-
10-b&chapter=18&clang=_en, last visited on 23 April 2017 
 8 
two bodies now have some of the same competences, but for different purposes: the 
Security Council may determine the existence of an act of aggression committed by a 
State, for its political purposes under Chapter VII and the ICC may do the same when 
deciding on the culpability for a crime of aggression committed by an individual. While 
the ICC’s jurisdiction on the crime of aggression is not always fully dependent on the 
Security Council making a determination on aggression, it is highly unlikely that the 
ICC would be seized of a situation on aggression that would not at the same time be on 
the agenda of the Security Council. The ICC may therefore have situations before it 
wherein it will have to examine, scrutinize, or at least take into consideration Security 
Council resolutions, albeit within the limitations of its own jurisdiction. It is possible 
that the ICC and the Security Council may come to different conclusions on whether 
an act of aggression has taken place in the same situation. This is a new situation in 
international law, because no other international court has a similar, direct jurisdictional 
relationship with the Security Council. It is precisely for this reason that this new 
situation leads to an interesting question. Would this new relationship entail some form 
of judicial review by the International Criminal Court of Security Council resolutions 
and in particular, of the Security Council’s determinations on aggression?  
 9 
2. AGGRESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
2.1. Aggression and the United Nations  
2.1.1. Aggression and the maintenance of international peace and security 
 
The Charter of the United Nations renounces dispute-settlement by armed force.37 The 
preamble to the Charter provides that ‘armed force shall not be used, save in the 
common interest’.38 Article 2(4) of the Charter provides that all members of the UN 
shall refrain from using or threatening to use force ‘against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any other State or in any manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations’.39 A State has ‘the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence’ where the State has been attacked and until the Security Council 
has taken ‘measures necessary to maintain international peace and security’ according 
to Article 51.40 Further, according to Article 42, the Security Council may also 
authorize a State, or several States, to use armed force as a measure to ‘maintain or 
restore international peace and security’ if the Council has determined an existence of 
a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or act of aggression in accordance with 
Article 39 of the Charter.41  
 
Maintaining peace is one of the most important tasks of the United Nations and 
questions pertaining to aggression fall within that scope.42 The UN Charter provides for 
a division of powers and tasks between its organs to deal with global collective 
security.43 The ‘primary responsibility’ for the maintenance of international peace and 
security is bestowed upon the Security Council in Article 24(1) ‘in order to ensure 
                                                 
37 Goodrich, Leland M., Hambro, Edvard and Simons, Anne Patricia, Charter of the United Nations – 
Commentary and Documents (3rd edn, Coumbia University Press: New York, 1969)  at 41 
38 Preamble of UN Charter, It should be read together with the articles on collective security in the 
Charter, see: Simma, Bruno, Khan, Daniel-Erasmus, Nolte, Georg and Paulus, Andreas (eds.), The 
Charter of the United Nations – A Commentary, (3rd edition, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2012)  
(hereinafter referred to as Simma Commentary) at 105  
39 Article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
40 Article 51 of the UN Charter 
41 Article 39 of the UN Charter 
42 Leland M. Goodrich, The United Nations (Stevens and Sons Ltd: London, 1959)  at 159 & 161; 
Kelsen, Hans, ‘Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense under the Charter of the United 
Nations’, 42 American Journal of International Law 4 (1948) 783-796 
43 Leland M. Goodrich, The United Nations (Stevens and Sons Ltd: London, 1959) at 159 and 161; 
Kelsen, Hans, ‘Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense under the Charter of the United 
Nations’, 42 American Journal of International Law 4 (1948) 783-796 Ibid. at 138  
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effective and prompt action by the United Nations’.44  It has been discussed whether 
the Security Council’s competence is both primary and exclusive or whether its 
competence is only primary in relation to other organs.45 In the Certain Expenses case 
and the Wall Advisory Opinion the International Court of Justice (hereinafter also 
referred to as ICJ or, where appropriate, ‘the Court’) considered the interpretation of 
Article 24(1) and the scope of the Security Council’s primary responsibility.46 The 
Court held that the Security Council’s primary responsibility refers to its mandate to 
take enforcing action when maintaining international peace and security as provided 
for in Chapters VI and VII of the Charter.47 In Wall, the ICJ noted that this primary 
responsibility to take action does ‘not necessarily’ entail exclusive competence.48 The 
division of labour set forth in the Charter  refers to UN organs and does not as such 
refer to organs outside of the UN.49 With Article 24(1) States also agree that the 
Security Council ‘acts on their behalf’ when carrying out its duties.50  
 
The primacy of the Security Council in terms of maintaining of international peace and 
security can also be read through the provisions on the General Assembly in the UN 
Charter. According to Article 11 of the Charter, the General Assembly may for example 
discuss general issues relating to international peace and security, make 
recommendations on any questions pertaining to the maintenance of peace and security, 
and it may also call on the Security Council’s attention to such situations.51 Article 12 
of the Charter limits this competence: the General Assembly shall not make any 
recommendations while the Security Council is seized of the same dispute or 
situation.52 This has developed differently in practice. Tomuschat writes that the 
prohibition of simultaneous action has ‘suffered an erosion’.53 In the Wall Advisory 
Opinion the ICJ noted that ‘there has been an increasing tendency over time for the 
                                                 
44 Article 24(1), Charter of the United Nations 
45 Meron, Theodor, ‘Defining Aggression for the International Criminal Court’, 25 Suffolk 
Transnational Law Review 1 (2001) 1-11  
46 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), (Advisory 
Opinion), ICJ Reports (1962) at 151  
47 Certain Expenses at 163 
48 Wall at 26 
49 Simma Commentary at 767 
50 Goodrich, Leland M., Hambro, Edvard and Simons, Anne Patricia, Charter of the United Nations – 
Commentary and Documents (3rd edn, Coumbia University Press: New York, 1969) at 202 
51 Article 11, Charter of the United Nations 
52 Article 12(1), Charter of the United Nations 
53 Tomuschat, Christian: Uniting for Peace, United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law, 
www.un.org/law/avl, last visited: 14 April 2017 at 2 
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General Assembly and the Security Council to deal in parallel with the same matter 
concerning the maintenance of international peace and security’.54 While there is some 
overlap between the organs, the primacy of the Security Council’s powers renders the 
General Assembly’s powers are still ‘residual and secondary’.55  
 
In 1950 the General Assembly passed the Uniting for Peace resolution, which allows it 
to engage deeper in the maintenance of international peace and security when the 
Security Council fails to do so due to a lack of unanimity. In such a situation the 
Security Council, or a majority of the members of the General Assembly, may request 
the General Assembly to convene an emergency special session to discuss the 
maintenance of international peace and security.56 The General Assembly may pass a 
resolution on the situation and make recommendations on collective measures 
‘including in the case of a breach of the peace or an act of aggression and the use of 
armed force when necessary’.57 It is to be noted, however, that this resolution only 
refers to ‘recommendations’ and not to actions that would be binding.58 Indeed, over 
the years, the General Assembly has held ten emergency special sessions passed several 
resolutions by authorization of the Uniting for Peace resolution. The first one was 
related to the war between Israel and Egypt in 1956, thereafter the General Assembly 
considered the Soviet invasion of Hungary, the Lebanon crisis, the Congo Crisis, the 
Six-Day war, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, the 
South African occupation of Namibia, the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights, and 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with a particular focus on the Israeli-Occupied 
Territories and East Jerusalem.59 This last session on the Israel-Palestine conflict was 
adjourned in January 2009 and is still ongoing.60 Tomuschat writes that emergency 
special sessions are now an accepted form of activity for the General Assembly, even 
                                                 
54 Legal consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ 
(Advisory Opinion) ICJ Report (2004) p.136 at 27 and 28  
55 Simma Commentary at 768 
56 Uniting For Peace, GA Res. 377 (V), 3 November 1950 
57 Simma Commentray at 768 
58 Tomuschat, Christian: Uniting for Peace, United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law, 
www.un.org/law/avl, last visited: 14 April 2017 at 1 
59 Emergency Special Sessions http://www.un.org/en/ga/sessions/emergency.shtml, accessed on 10 
April 2017 
60General Assembly resolution supporting the immediate ceasefire according to Security Council 
resolution 1860 (2009), GA Res. ES-10/18, 23 January 2009, at pp. 6 
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though it was not intended by the drafters of the Charter.61 The Uniting for Peace system 
has shown the strength of the non-aligned movement in the General Assembly.62 
However, a majority of the decisions relate to Israel and the Middle-East and 
suggestions to trigger the mechanism in situations related to Kosovo and Rwanda were 
not successful.63    
 
It must be noted that the Uniting for Peace resolution was set in a different era and it is 
inherently polarized. It was elaborated by the United States and its allies due to 
differences with the Soviet Union on the Korea crisis and in practice the reactivation of 
the Security Council in the beginning of the 1990’s diminished its significance.64 
Today, with increasing tensions among the permanent members of the Security Council 
it may be worthwhile to consider whether Uniting for Peace is a thing for the past or a 
way forward. For example, the situations in Syria and in Ukraine have once again 
demonstrated how permanent members can incapacitate the Security Council even in 
situations where there are clear violations of the UN Charter.65 In November 2016 
several non-governmental organizations urged Member States of the UN to request a 
General Assembly emergency special session on Syria.66 No emergency special session 
was held, however, the General Assembly did create an accountability mechanism for 
Syria.67 It has been stipulated that even though the members of the General Assembly 
outnumber the permanent members of the Security Council it is unrealistic to believe 
that States would decide upon or enact collective measures and the use of armed force 
without the support of at least one of the larger powers. Therefore, while the General 
Assembly could start playing a bigger role with regard to the maintenance of 
international peace and security by utilizing Uniting for Peace, it would perhaps be 
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naïve to believe that it would not be used as a vehicle by one of the permanent members 
to circumvent an issue that is deadlocked at the Security Council.68  
 
The jurisdiction of the principal judicial organ of the United Nations: the International 
Court of Justice (hereinafter also referred to as the ‘ICJ’, or where appropriate, ‘the 
Court’) is not limited to disputes on a specific subject matter. Article 36, paragraph 1 
of the Statute of the ICJ provides that its jurisdiction ‘comprises all cases which the 
parties refer to it or are provided for in the Charter’.69 According to paragraph 2 of said 
Article, the jurisdiction of the Court entails ‘all legal disputes’ of States concerning 
inter alia ‘the interpretation of a treaty’, ‘any question of international law’ and ‘the 
existence of any fact, which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international 
obligation’.70 Furthermore, the ICJ may also give advisory opinions to organs of the 
United Nations on any legal question according to Article 96 of the Charter.71 
Therefore, the Court may consider and adjudge disputes relating to aggression, as it did 
for example in the Nicaragua case.72  
 
While Article 24 provides guidance on the division of competences, Article 39 has been 
referred to as ‘the single most important provision of the Charter’.73 In its entirety, 
Article 39 it provides: ‘the Security Council shall determine the existence of any 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 
41 and 42’.74 The provision empowers the Security Council to determine whether one 
of the three situations enumerated in Article 39 are at hand.75 The determination is a 
precondition to a subsequent decision on enforcement measures.76 It is not a legal 
finding, it is a political decision and its  purpose is simply to empower the Council to 
                                                 
68 Tomuschat, p.4 
69 Article 36, Statute of the International Court of Justice 
70 Article 36(2), Statute of the International Court of Justice 
71 Article 96, Charter of the United Nations 
72 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), (Merits) ICJ Reports (1986) at 14 
73 Simma Commentary at 1273 referring to: US Secretary of State, ‘Report to the President on the 
Results of the San Fransisco Conference’ (1945) at 90-1 
74 Article 39, Charter of the United Nations 
75 Alain Pellet, La Charte des Nations Unies – Commentaire Article par Article (3rd edition, 
Economica: Paris, 2005) at 1132 
76 Simma Commentary at 1294 
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take action under Chapter VII in order to restore peace.77  The drafters of the Charter 
decided to leave it for the Security Council itself to determine what constitutes an act 
of aggression and it enjoys wide discretion when exercising this power.78 The Article  
‘empowers, but does not oblige the Security Council’ to take action.79 Even if the 
Security Council considers that the conditions under Article 39 are present, it may 
decide not to take any action.80 The Security Council is not bound by the law beyond 
the scope of the Charter or peremptory norms when making the determination. A 
determination by the Security Council does not indicate a violation of international law, 
it is rather a preliminary exclamation for political purposes.81 
 
While aggression may be mentioned in debates or in draft resolutions of the Security 
Council, it seldom announces that an act of aggression has taken place, often due to the 
permanent members’ right to veto.82 In fact, the Security Council has been inclined 
towards not determining the existence of aggression even in so-called ‘clear’ cases.83 
For example, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, the Security Council determined it as a ‘mere’ 
breach to the peace, not an act of aggression, although it generally is considered that it 
was an act of aggression.84 The Security Council’s reluctance to determine the existence 
of acts of aggression, and ‘accuse’ States of committing acts of aggression can be traced 
back to the absence of an explicit agreement on a definition of aggression.85 It has also 
been opined that the members of the Security Council are unwilling to entrench 
themselves in a debate on aggression for a fear of a resolution not receiving the majority 
required for the adoption of a resolution and not being able to act as promptly as 
needed.86 However, the fact that the Council does not determine a situation as an act of 
aggression, does not necessarily entail that aggression has not taken place.87  
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Chapter VII does not categorise the enforcement measures according to whether a 
situation constitutes a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression.. 
The Security Council may proceed with the same measures regardless of whether it 
States that an act of aggression or a breach to the peace has taken place. While the 
Security Council has to make a determination under Article 39 in order to proceed with 
enforcement measures, it is not bound to refer to the Article itself in its resolution. In 
its practice, the Security Council has come to refer to Chapter VII if a specific resolution 
is of a binding nature. Unless the Security Council specifically mentions Chapter VII 
or by other means indicates the mandatory nature of its resolution, a resolution should 
be interpreted narrowly and not as a binding base for Chapter VII measures.88  
 
 
2.1.2. Aggression in the practice of UN organs 
 
During the past decades the Security Council has examined several situations related to 
aggressive acts. In some situations it has mentioned aggression specifically either in the 
preambular or operative paragraphs (in some resolutions in both), and in other 
situations it has not specifically mentioned aggression. What follows is a recollection 
of the resolutions where the Security Council has mentioned acts of aggression. The 
International Court of Justice and the General Assembly have also been seized with 
matters pertaining to aggression but for the purposes of this study it is more relevant to 
focus on the practice of the Security Council when it comes to decisions and 
determinations on the existence of acts of aggression. 
 
In relation to the Rhodesian Bush War or the Zimbabwe War of Liberation (1964 – 
1979), the Security Council passed five resolutions condemning acts of aggression 
committed by Southern Rhodesia. In resolution 232 (1966), the Security Council had 
stated that it was acting in accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter and had 
determined the situation in Southern Rhodesia constituted a threat to international peace 
and security.89 Later, in resolution 326 (1973), the Security Council referred back to 
this earlier resolution and Stated that Southern Rhodesia had perpetrated ‘provocative 
                                                 
88 Simma Commentary at 1295 
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and aggressive acts against the economy and security of the Republic of Zambia’.90 
Resolution 424 (1978) also concerned Southern Rhodesia’s activities against Zambia 
and the Security Council reaffirmed that ‘the existence of the minority racist régime in 
Southern Rhodesia and the continuance of its acts of aggression against Zambia and 
other neighbouring States constitute a threat to international peace and security’91 and  
expressed its grave concern with the ‘numerous hostile and unprovoked acts of 
aggression [...] violating the sovereignty, airspace and territorial integrity’ of Zambia.92 
Aggression by Southern Rhodesia against Mozambique was considered in resolutions 
386 (1976)93 and 411 (1977)94. The Security Council condemned the ‘provocative and 
aggressive acts, including military incursions’ by Southern Rhodesia against 
Mozambique95 as well as its indignation at ‘systematic acts of aggression’ committed 
by Southern Rhodesia96 and strongly condemned the acts of aggression97. In resolution 
455 (1979) the Security Council determined that the armed invasion of Angola, 
Mozambique, and Zambia by Southern Rhodesia was a ‘flagrant violation of the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity’ of these countries98, it further noted that it was 
‘gravely concerned about the ‘premeditated and provocative acts of aggression’99, and 
that the ‘continuance of [Southern Rhodesia’s] acts of aggression against neighbouring 
independent States constitute a threat to international peace and security’.100 Towards 
the end of the war, the Security Council adopted resolution 455 (1979) on aggression 
against Zambia by Southern Rhodesia in collaboration with South Africa. The Security 
Council expressed its grave concern with the ‘numerous hostile and unprovoked acts 
of aggression’ committed by Southern Rhodesia ‘violating the sovereignty, air space, 
and territorial integrity’ of Zambia.101 The Security Council also strongly condemned 
the ‘continued, intensified, and unprovoked acts of aggression’ as well as the collusion 
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of South Africa in the ‘repeated acts of aggression’ by Southern Rhodesia against 
Zambia.102 
 
During 1976 – 1987 the Security Council was seized with the armed activities and 
aggression by South Africa against Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, and Seychelles. In 
resolutions 387 (1976), 546 (1984), and 571 (1985) the Security Council expressed its 
grave concern and condemned the ‘acts of aggression’103, ‘persistent acts of 
aggression’104, ‘escalated acts of aggression’105, and ‘wanton acts of aggression’106 
committed by South Africa in violation of Angola’s ‘sovereignty, airspace, and 
territorial integrity’107. On South Africa’s aggression against Botswana the Security 
Council strongly condemned ‘South Africa’s recent unprovoked and unwarranted 
military attack on the capital of Botswana as an act of aggression against that 
country’108 and mentioned in a later resolution aggression as a reason for South Africa 
to pay compensation to Botswana109. In relation to the situation in Lesotho, the Security 
Council expressed its grave concern about South Africa’s ‘premeditated’110 and 
‘wanton’111 aggressive act against Lesotho and also expressed its deep concern about 
the ‘gravity of the aggressive acts’112. Further, the Security Council called upon South 
Africa to publicly declare that it would refrain from committing aggression against 
Lesotho.113 In resolution 580 (1985) the Security Council referred to aggressive acts in 
the preambular paragraphs of the resolution and only mentioned ‘unprovoked and 
premeditated killings’ by South Africa ‘in violation of the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity’ of Lesotho in the operative paragraphs.114 In resolution 496 (1981) the 
Security Council condemned the ‘mercenary aggression’ committed against Seychelles 
and established a commission of inquiry to investigate the origin, background, and 
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financing of said act of aggression.115 After a report by the commission, the Security 
Council continued to express its grave condemnation about the ‘mercenary aggression’ 
against Seychelles ‘prepared in and executed from South Africa’.  
 
The Security Council has also condemned attacks by Israel on Tunisia as acts of 
aggression. In resolution 573 (1985) the Security Council ‘vigorously’ condemned the 
‘act of armed aggression’ committed by Israel against Tunisia.116 In resolution 611 
(1988) the Security Council referred to the ‘new act of aggression’ committed by Israel 
on Tunisia and vigorously condemned it.117 In the situation concerning Benin the 
Security Council strongly condemned an attack by mercenaries on Benin as an act of 
armed aggression perpetrated against Benin.118 In 1990 the Security Council considered 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in a number of resolutions, but failed to determine it as an 
act of aggression.119 However, after Iraq had closed off diplomatic missions in Kuwait, 
the Security Council condemned in resolution 667 (1990) the ‘aggressive acts’ against 
the diplomatic missions and personnel in Kuwait.120 It should be noted that the 
Repertoire on the Security Council’s practice does not refer to this as a determination 
on aggression.121 
 
As this study focuses on Security Council resolutions, it will not delve further into all 
the resolutions that the General Assembly has passed on aggression. A few situations 
are noted below in order to highlight that dealing with aggression is by no means an 
exclusive power of the Security Council, but otherwise it suffices to simply take note 
that both the General Assembly and the International Court of Justice have dealt with 
aggression in their own practice. Independent from its powers under the Uniting for 
Peace resolution, the General Assembly has also referred to aggression in particular in 
the Declaration on Friendly Relations122 in 1970 and a number of procedural resolutions 
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with the purpose of facilitating the production of a definition of aggression: a task which 
the General Assembly finished in 1974 with Resolution 3314 (XXIX).123 By 
authorization by the United for Peace resolution, in resolution 498 (V) on Korea124, the 
General Assembly Stated that it found that ‘the Central People’s Government of 
People’s Republic of China, by giving direct aid and assistance to those who were 
already committing aggression in Korea and by engaging in hostilities against United 
Nations forces there, has itself engaged aggression in Korea’.125 Further, the resolution 
called for a cessation of the hostilities, a withdrawal of Chinese troops, for States to 
give assistance to the UN operation in Korea, and requested a committee to consider 
additional collective measures.126  
 
It must also be noted that while there may be a surprising amount of resolutions on 
aggression127, in comparison to the number of armed conflicts of international character 
since the inception of the United Nations in 1945 the action by the Security Council 
(and the other organs) appears quite meagre. The Security Council has been 
‘unpredictable’ in its practice, to say the least.128 One of the reasons of this is the 
inherent political nature of the term ‘aggression’ and the existence in practice of a 
certain political threshold that has to be met before even clear cases of aggression are 
called out as such by the Security Council. 129 The Security Council is not subjected to 
the kind of strict legal standards that would be required by a court of law.130 Another 
reason is obviously the role of the permanent members of the Security Council in many 
of the afore-mentioned armed conflicts: it goes against the realpolitik of the Security 
Council that any of its permanent members would be condemned of an act of 
aggression. This of course, is vividly apparent in the recent activities by some of its 
permanent members. In April 2017, the United States unleashed a missile strike on 
Syria in response to the alleged use of chemical weapons against civilians by the Assad 
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regime. While Russia and Syria Stated that this was an act of aggression, a number of 
States lauded the attack by the United States.131 The notion of using force to ‘punish’ 
Syria for its acts against civilians has been criticized.132 Similarly, the occupation and 
annexation of Crimea by Russia may be determined as acts of aggression within the 
scope of the Definition of Aggression, but for obvious reasons the Security Council has 
been incapacitated to do so.133 However, Article 39 is there for the purposes of taking 
action under Chapter VII and for the political settlement of disputes by sanctions, the 
use of force, or other means. It has been argued that the law on the use of force therefore 
has to succumb to the political ‘imperative of peace-making’.134  
2.1.3. Definition of Aggression 
 
One could submit that defining aggression within the UN system has been a two-
pronged story. First, there seems to have been a need to define aggression for 
institutional purposes: on the one hand to complement the Charter with a definition of 
aggression and build on the work by the drafters of the Charter and on the other hand 
for the purposes of drafting an international convention defining international crimes 
and individual criminal responsibility for those crimes. Second, the organs of the UN 
have in their practice elaborated at least some kind of a structure of what kind of acts 
could be considered to amount to acts of aggression.135  
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Historically, the word ‘aggression’ meant an armed attack by a State, without 
connotations to whether or not it was unlawful or lawful.136 The Charter does not define 
aggression, but sets a legal framework for lawful and unlawful use of force by States 
and therefore also sets the outer frames for aggression. Aggression is understood as the 
unlawful use of armed force by a State against another State or its interests in a manner 
inconsistent with the rules of the use of force set out in the Charter of the UN. 137 It is 
the absence of an authorization by the Security Council to use force under Chapter VII 
of the Charter, or the absence of circumstances that would amount to self-defence in 
accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, that determine whether or not an act of 
aggression amounts to an unlawful armed attack. It is still a general and open-ended 
definition. In comparison to the other situations under Article 39 a threat to the peace 
is a more elastic concept, which does not require armed hostilities. Breach of the peace 
is armed violence between two states, for example the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait or the 
Falkland/Malvinas conflict between the United Kingdom and Argentina.138 Aggression 
is a direct or indirect use of force and it is always also a breach of the peace. Unlawful 
armed attacks are acts of aggression, but the Security Council has also determined lesser 
military activities as aggression.139 It has been suggested that an act of aggression is 
comprised of an act of violence by a State paired with aggressive intent (animus 
aggressionis).140 However, the wide discretionary powers for the Security Council to 
decide what constitutes aggression muddies the waters on what action can constitute 
aggression.141  
 
The drafters of the UN Charter considered including a definition of aggression in the 
Charter but decided otherwise.142 They found that it was impossible to define 
aggression exhaustively due to expected progress in modern warfare; they also feared 
that the Security Council would refrain from acting upon lesser acts than those defined 
as aggression; and suspected that an enumerative and non-exhaustive list of aggressive 
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acts would lead to States distorting the definition restrain the Security Council from 
acting upon lesser acts.143 The drafters decided to leave it up to the Security Council to 
determine the existence of an act of aggression on a case by case basis.144 However, 
there was an understanding that the UN Member States would have to come to an 
agreement on how to define aggression in order for the Security Council to be able to 
fulfil its mandate.145 In 1950 the General Assembly referred a proposal on aggression 
for consideration by the International Law Commission.146The ILC could not agree on 
a definition for aggression but did end up working on a definition for a crime of 
aggression for the purposes of the Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind.147 The work and debate on a definition on aggression continued 
over the years in the general debate of the General Assembly148; in Special Committees 
established by the UNGA149; in a consultation between the Secretary General and newly 
joined UN member States in 1957150; and in the Sixth Committee151. In 1968 the work 
of the Special Committee bore fruit in the form of a compromise draft for a definition 
for aggression written by thirteen States which was later approved in the report of the 
Committee.152 This draft would form the base for the Definition of Aggression passed 
by the General Assembly in resolution 3314 in 1974. The definition on aggression reads 
as follows, in Article 1: 
 ‘[a]ggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this 
Definition.’  
 
Article 3 of the Definition of Aggression enumerates acts which qualify as acts of 
aggression regardless of whether there has been a prior declaration of war: 
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“(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of 
another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from 
such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory 
of another State or part thereof, 
 
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of 
another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of 
another State; 
 
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of 
another State; 
 
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or 
marine and air fleets of another State; 
 
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of 
another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the 
conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in 
such territory beyond the termination of the agreement; 
 
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the 
disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act 
of aggression against a third State; 
 
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars 
or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of 
such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial 
involvement therein.” 
 
According to Article 2 of the definition, the first use of force without the authorization 
of the Security Council, or without evidence of self-defence, is prima facie considered 
to be an act of aggression.153 However, the Security Council may decide not to 
determine that act as an act of aggression if the use of force was ‘justified’ or ‘not of 
sufficient gravity’.154 complicates the definition because neither the Charter nor 
Resolution 3314 provide any guidance on what kinds of acts may be justified or not of 
sufficient gravity to amount to acts of aggression. As noted above, in the end this falls 
within the wide discretionary powers of the Security Council.155 According to Article 
4 of the Definition of Aggression, the Security Council may also determine other than 
the enumerated acts enumerated as acts as aggression.156 The result of Articles 2 and 4  
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has been referred to as the ‘double-openness’ of the Definition of the Aggression.157 
The Security Council is not unequivocally bound by the definition, although the 
International Court of Justice has concluded that it is an ‘expression of the law’.158 In 
the preambular paragraphs of resolution 3314 the General Assembly merely ‘calls the 
attention’ of the Security Council to the Definition of Aggression and recommends that 
the Security Council uses the definition as guidance when determining the existence of 
an act of aggression.159 While the General Assembly resolution defines an act of 
aggression, it does not define the crime of aggression or what would constitute 
individual criminal responsibility for an act of aggression. 
 
2.2. Aggression in the Rome Statute  
2.2.1. Determining individual criminal responsibility for the crime of 
aggression 
 
As noted above in chapter 1.1, the Rome Statute was amended in 2010 to include in 
Article 8 bis a definition of the crime of aggression for the purposes of the ICC: e.g. for 
the purposes of holding individuals accountable for aggression. The definition mirrors 
and builds upon the afore-mentioned General Assembly definition of acts of 
aggression.160 In Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute, the crime of aggression is defined 
as ‘the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position 
effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, 
of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest 
violation of the Charter of the United Nations.’ Therefore a crime of aggression takes 
place when a person with significant leadership status within a State has planned, 
prepared, initiated or executed an act of aggression, of such a grave nature that it 
constitutes a manifest violation of the UN Charter.161 Paragraph 2 of Article 8 bis 
defines acts of aggression as ‘the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner 
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inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.’  Paragraph 2 also replicates the 
list of acts that may constitute acts of aggression from General Assembly resolution 
3314. Thus, according to the Rome Statute, any of the following acts may qualify as 
acts of aggression for the purposes of the ICC: an invasion or attack on another State 
or its military forces, military occupation, forceful annexations of territories of other 
States, bombardments or the use of any weapons by one State against the territory of 
another States, military blockades of ports or coasts, attacks by the armed forces on the 
forces of another State, the use of armed forces present by agreement of the receiving 
State in contravention of that agreement, allowing a territory to be used by another State 
for perpetrating an act of aggression on a third State or sending irregular armed groups 
or mercenaries to conduct armed acts on another State.  
 
While the definition of a crime of aggression in the Rome Statute builds upon the 
definition of aggression within the UN system, but there are certain differences. The 
Rome Statute definition provides an exhaustive list of acts of aggression, where the 
General Assembly definition is non-exhaustive. Both Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute 
and Article 3 of the GA resolution contain identical lists for acts of aggression. But the 
General Assembly definition goes on to note, in Article 4, that the ‘acts enumerated 
above are not exhaustive and the Security Council may determine that other acts 
constitute aggression under the provisions of the Charter’. Thereby the Definition of 
Aggression definition allows for the determining of also any other acts as aggressive 
acts. The definition in the Rome Statute does not give the ICC such powers.162 This 
may turn out to be a real weakness in particular when it comes to concepts of modern 
warfare, which do not seem to be covered by the current definition. 
 
Some scholars have voiced critique on the definition.163  As noted above, the crime of 
aggression is defined as a leadership crime. Due to this limitation, individual criminal 
responsibility for aggression is restricted to persons in charge of the political and 
military operations of a country. Other leaders, such as those with economic or religious 
power do not fit within this definition, unless attested that they have had a strong 
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‘leadership-like’ influence on the political and military powers.164 It has been contested 
whether it was appropriate to limit the definition to this extent.165 Indeed, individuals 
with economic power, namely directors of a chemical firm that had manufactured 
weapons during World War II, had been held to account for preparing an aggressive 
war in the I.G. Farben case at Nuremberg.166 One could certainly make the argument 
that if economic powers, and especially entities manufacturing weapons, could be held 
liable for aggression in the 1940’s perhaps it is not that far-fetched that economic 
powers could hypothetically engage in similar activities in 2017 and beyond.167 Even 
the Security Council has mentioned economic instability in resolutions on 
aggression.168 The drafters had an option to select the approach taken in Nuremberg 
and connect the definition for the crime to whether a person could ‘shape and influence’ 
the crime rather than whether the person had a certain formal status within the State or 
military apparatus.169 It is unclear why the drafters in the end decided not to choose this 
approach, although the concern had been voiced during the negotiations.170 
 
2.2.2. General provisions on jurisdiction in the Rome Statute 
 
As noted above in chapter 1, in addition to agreeing on a definition of the crime of 
aggression the Rome Statute the Review Conference agreed on the conditions under 
which the ICC may exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. In order to 
understand the framework of the jurisdiction of the ICC for the crime of aggression, it 
is important to first lay out the jurisdiction of the ICC for other crimes than the crime 
of aggression. 
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The current conditions under which the ICC may exercise its jurisdiction over genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes; are laid out in Articles 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 
of the Rome Statute. According to Article 13 of the Statute, the ICC’s jurisdiction may 
only be triggered by a State referral, a referral by the Security Council or by a proprio 
motu investigation initiated by the Prosecutor.171 Territorially, any State referral or 
proprio motu investigation is limited to the territories and/or nationals of the States 
Parties to the Statute172, while the Security Council may refer situations concerning a 
non-State Party and a State Party.173 In accordance with Article 12(3) of the Rome 
Statute, the ICC may also exercise its jurisdiction over a non-State Party, if said State 
lodges an acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction with respect to a specific crime or 
situation and thus submits itself voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the Court, without 
becoming a full-on State Party.174 Temporally, the Court’s jurisdiction is limited only 
to those crimes committed after the entry into force of the Rome Statute on 1 July 
2002.175 The situations, cases, and preliminary examinations currently before the Court 
have been triggered by State referrals (Uganda176, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo177, Central African Republic178, a second situation in the Central African 
Republic179, Mali180, Gabon181, Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece, and Cambodia 
182 ), two Security Council referrals (Darfur, the Sudan183 and Libya184), two proprio 
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motu requests by the Prosecutor (Kenya185, Georgia186), and three acceptances of the 
Court’s jurisdiction in accordance with Article 12(3) (Côte d'Ivoire187, Palestinian 
National Authority188, and Ukraine189).  
 
The ICC’s jurisdiction is further limited by thresholds embedded into the Statute, 
namely Article 1 of the Statute which States that the ICC ‘shall have the power to 
exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international 
concern’.190 The Preamble to the Rome Statute contains a narrower threshold as it refers 
to the ICC’s ‘jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole’191, repeated also in the chapeau of Article 5192. According to 
Zimmermann, the chapeau confirms the Court’s subject matter to these cases.193 
Furthermore, he contends that the Court will have to take these thresholds into 
consideration while interpreting the scope of the crimes, for instance only those war 
crimes within a situation which are ‘of concern to the international community as a 
whole’ shall be brought before the Court. 194 In practice these provisions have guided 
and also limited the Prosecutor’s investigations to the most serious situations.195  
 
2.2.3. Conditions to exercise jurisdiction for the crime of aggression 
 
The conditions to exercise jurisdiction for the crime of aggression are divided into two 
separate articles. Article 15 bis  provides for the jurisdiction of situations referred to the 
ICC by States Parties or initiated proprio motu by the Prosecutor. Article 15 ter 
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provides for the jurisdiction in situations where the Security Council has referred a 
situation to the Court. In this situation, no separate determination on the existence of an 
act of aggression is required by the Security Council. This was agreed because it was 
found that if the Security Council referred to the Court a situation that was related to 
aggression, it had already taken a stand on whether or not to engage the Court on the 
matter since Security Council referrals are to be submitted as Chapter VII decisions.196  
 
It is worthwhile noting that taking into account the negotiation background of these 
provisions, the structure of the jurisdictional provisions is in itself a win, because it 
splits up the jurisdiction of the Court depending on how the proceedings were triggered 
rather than providing one restrictive jurisdictional scheme for all situations concerning 
the crime of aggression.197 As noted above, for all the other crimes within the scope of 
the Rome Statute, the jurisdiction of the ICC can be triggered by three to four different 
ways, depending on how you read the Statute. For the crime of aggression the 
jurisdiction, and the relationship of the Court and the Security Council, was split into 
one provision providing for the jurisdiction of the crime of aggression for State referrals 
and proprio motu investigations (Article 15 bis) and another provision providing for 
the jurisdiction of the crime of aggression for Security Council referrals (Article 15 ter).  
 
Article 15 bis provides for the jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in situations 
referred to the Court by States Parties or initiated by proprio motu investigations by the 
Prosecutor of the Court. Further, the Court’s jurisdiction personae and loci for the crime 
of aggression is limited by paragraph 5 of Article 15 bis. The Court may not exercise 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression where the crime was committed by nationals 
of or on the territory of a State that is not party to the Rome Statute. This limits the 
Court’s jurisdiction further in respect of the crime of aggression than in respect of the 
other crimes.  Paragraph 6 determines the role of a Security Council referral when a 
situation on the crime of aggression is triggered by State referral or proprio motu 
investigations: ‘[w]hen the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to 
proceed with an investigation in respect of a crime of aggression, he or she shall first 
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ascertain whether the Security Council has made a determination of an act of aggression 
committed by the State concerned. The Prosecutor shall notify the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations of the situation before the Court, including any relevant 
information and documents.’.198 Further, paragraph 7 provides that if the Security 
Council has made a determination of an act of aggression, the Prosecutor may proceed 
with the investigation.199 According to paragraph 8, if no such determination  has been 
made by the Security Council within six months after the notification, the Prosecutor 
may proceed with the investigation, unless the Security Council has deferred the 
investigation under Article 16 of the Statute.200  
 
Paragraph 9 of Article 15 bis and paragraph 4 of Article 15 ter provides that ‘[a] 
determination of an act of aggression by an organ outside the Court shall be without 
prejudice to the Court’s own findings under this Statute.’. This is understood to entail 
that the ICC is not bound by the Security Council’s determination on aggression.201 
 
Articles 15 bis and 15 ter also contain a temporal restriction of the Court’s jurisdiction, 
subject to ratification of the amendments and a separate decision by the Assembly of 
States Parties of the ICC. According to paragraph 2 of Articles 15 bis and 15 ter the 
Court may exercise jurisdiction only with respect to crimes of aggression committed 
one year after the ratification or acceptance of the amendments by thirty States Parties. 
According to paragraph 3 of both provisions ‘[t]he Court shall exercise jurisdiction over 
the crime of aggression in accordance with this Article, subject to a decision to be taken 
after 1 January 2017 by the same majority of States Parties as is required for the 
adoption of an amendment to the Statute.’. According to paragraph 4 of Article 15 bis, 
a State Party may also opt out of the aggression amendments, because Court’s 
jurisdiction is limited by declarations from State Parties not accepting the jurisdiction 
of the Court for the crime of aggression in particular.   
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The activation of the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is also limited 
by the amendment provisions of the Rome Statute.202 As noted above, the entry into 
force of these provisions is subject to the amendments rules of Article 121(5) of the 
Statute. In addition, where an amendment to a definition of a crime is concerned, the 
Court shall not exercise its  jurisdiction  regarding  a crime covered by the amendment 
when committed by that State Party's nationals or on its territory, if that State  Party has 
not which  has  not accepted  the  amendment.203 While it is an interesting topic, it is 
not of deeper relevance for the purposes of this study.  
 
2.3. Conclusion: the ICC’s relationship with the United Nations 
 
The ICC’s establishment was initiated within the UN framework.204  While the ICC 
does not form part of the UN system, a close relationship between the two organisations 
is embedded into the Rome Statute. In the Preamble to the Statute the States Parties 
reaffirm ‘the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations’ and establish 
the ICC ‘in relationship with the United Nations system’.205 The ICC preamble further 
provides that the crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction may threaten the peace and 
security of the world, therefore alluding to Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter.206 
It follows that the Rome Statute provides for a rather elaborated relationship between 
the ICC and the Security Council.207 The Statute crystallizes the role of the Security 
Council into jurisdictional tasks, relating to the triggering and de-triggering of the 
Court’s jurisdiction, and policing tasks relating to enforcement of the obligations to 
cooperate with the Court.  
 
The jurisdictional role of the Security Council is provided for in Articles 13(b) and 16 
of the Statute. As noted above in chapter 2.2 according to Article 13 (b) the Security 
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Council may refer any situation for the Court’s investigation208, including situations 
involving non-State Parties209. Bestowing upon the Security Council the competence to 
refer situations seemed appropriate because it had already ‘referred’ the situations of 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda to the ad hoc tribunals and because the referral seemed 
to eliminate the need to establish new ad hoc tribunals in the future.210 As noted above, 
so far the Security Council has done so with respect to only two situations. The situation 
in Darfur, was referred to the ICC in March 2005211 and the situation in Libya was 
referred to the ICC in February 2011212.  
 
According to Article 16 the Security Council may also defer investigations or 
prosecutions before the Court. Article 16 of the Statute provides that ‘[n]o investigation 
or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 
12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may 
be renewed by the Council under the same conditions.’213 The purpose of Article 16 is 
to ensure that the Security Council and the ICC would not go ‘into different directions’ 
in situations that are being considered by both organisations.214 To date, the Security 
Council has passed one resolution based on Article 16 of the Statute, namely resolution 
1422 (2002), requesting the ICC not to commence an investigation or prosecution into 
the acts or omissions of a non-State Party contributing to an operation established or 
authorised by the UN.215 Thus, the Security Council did a ‘pre-emptive’ deferral of 
hypothetical future investigations in the future on any situations relating to activities by 
a non-State Party in UN operations, but it has not yet deferred any real situations before 
the ICC.  
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Article 16 is a remnant of the jurisdictional provision in the ILC Draft Statute.216 The 
draft gave broad powers to the Security Council, as any situation that was simply put 
on its agenda would have barred the ICC to exercise its jurisdiction even indefinitely.217 
The ILC Draft further suggested that one veto would have been enough to bar the ICC 
from exercising its jurisdiction.218 This became controversial at the negotiations on the 
Rome Statute, as some States considered that the Security Council’s power to defer 
investigations obstructed the ICC’s independence and politicised the Court.219 A 
compromise was found in the current reading of Article 16: allowing the Security 
Council to halt investigations or prosecutions but requiring it to take a separate decision 
to do so. Thus it now takes at least nine votes to halt the ICC’s investigation as opposed 
to the one veto suggested by the ILC.220  
 
The jurisdictional competence of the Security Council, and in relation to its activities 
towards the ICC, is limited only by the Council’s mandate under the Charter.221  
According to Articles 13(c) and 16 of the Statute the Security Council is ‘acting under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations’ while it decides on the ICC’s 
jurisdiction.222 Thus, such decisions have to be taken under Chapter VII and may only 
come into question if the situation before the Security Council fulfils the criteria set out 
in Article 39 of the Charter, namely that the situation concerns a threat to the peace, a 
breach of the peace or aggression.223 It has been argued that ‘the Council must live 
within the parameters of the Statute’, such as the temporal restriction of the ICC’s 
jurisdiction to crimes committed after 1 July 2002 or the admissibility requirements 
provided for in Article 17 of the Rome Statute.224  
 
The Rome Statute furthermore provides a role for the Security Council where a State 
fails to cooperate with the ICC in relation to a situation that it has originally referred to 
the ICC. In such a situation the ICC may inform the Security Council of non-
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cooperation by the State.225 The Rome Statute does not provide for what kind of 
measures may follow such a notice, but it is understood that this refers to the 
mechanisms available to the Security Council under Chapters VI and VII of the Charter 
of the UN.226 According to Article 87(5)(b) of the Statute, the ICC may inform the 
Security Council if a State not party to the Statute ‘which has entered into an ad hoc 
arrangement or an agreement with the Court, fails to cooperate with requests pursuant 
to any such arrangement or agreement’.227 The ICC may also turn to the Council when 
a State Party does not comply with a request to cooperate.228 The Security Council may 
also become a ‘subject’ appearing before the ICC. When the Prosecutor decides to not 
proceed with an investigation or not to prosecute a situation referred to him or her the 
entity behind the referral, be it a State Party or the Security Council, may request the 
Pre-Trial Chamber to review the Prosecutor’s decision.229 In doing so, the Security 
Council is indeed bound by the procedures of the ICC. The Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence and the Regulations of the Court provide that such a request shall be in written 
format, supported with reasons, not longer than 100 pages and submitted within a 
certain timeframe.230 According to Article 115 (b) of the Rome Statute, the United 
Nations may provide funds to the ICC ‘in particular in relation to expenses incurred 
due to referrals by the Security Council’.231  
 
Article 2 of the Rome Statute provides for a formalisation of the relations between the 
ICC and the UN: ‘the Court shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations 
through an agreement to be approved by the Assembly of States Parties’232 This 
relationship agreement between the UN and the ICC was concluded in 2004. It defines 
the terms of the relationship between the two institutions.233 The operative parts of the 
agreement contain provisions outlining ‘[i]nstitutional relations’ (part two) and 
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‘cooperation and judicial assistance’ (part three).234  In more detail, the agreement 
provides inter alia for ‘[p]rinciples’ in Article 2, wherein both institutions recognise 
each other’s responsibilities and vow to respect the mandates of each other.235 The 
institutional relationship between the ICC and the Security Council is elaborate and 
assigns certain roles and tasks to the two. The amendments to the Rome Statute on 
aggression build upon that relationship and add a new dimension to it. This 
jurisdictional relationship is unique in that there is no other court with a similar task 
directly related to the Security Council’s powers under Chapter VII of the Charter. Nor 
is there a court that would have statutory obligations to make a decision on something 
that is so specifically assigned to the Security Council as a determination of aggression. 
In order for the ICC to be able to adjudge on a situation concerning the crime of 
aggression it has to make a decision on whether an act of aggression has taken place. 
This study will now proceed to examine this jurisdictional relationship between the ICC 
and the Security Council from the point of view of how international law and 
international courts have dealt with similar situations where courts have been faced 
with examining Security Council decisions. 
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3. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS  
3.1. The concept of judicial review in international law  
 
Judicial review entails the process wherein a judicial body reviews the legality of an 
act by the legislative or executive body. According to the Oxford Dictionary the term 
‘judicial review’ refers in the United Kingdom to a court examining ‘an administrative 
action by a public body’ and in the United States as the power of the Supreme Court to 
examine the constitutional validity of an act.236 Merriam-Webster defines judicial 
review as ‘a constitutional doctrine that gives to a court system the power to annul 
legislative or executive acts which the judges declare to be unconstitutional’.237 The 
Wex Legal Dictionary also anchors the notion to the US legal system in defining it as 
‘the idea, fundamental to the US system of government, that the actions of the executive 
and legislative branches of government are subject to review and possible invalidation 
by the judicial branch’ and notes that the US principle is based on the US Supreme 
Court case Marbury v. Madison.238 A similar constitutional doctrine also exists in some 
European legal systems, for example, there are constitutional courts in Germany and 
France.239  
 
Judicial review is not explicitly defined or provided for in any international treaty, thus 
in international law, the concept is based on theoretical constructions and practice of 
the international courts. International legal scholars are divided on whether 
international courts have the right to review Security Council decisions.240 Alvarez 
divides the scholars into two groups: the realists and the legalists. The realists, he 
writes, consider that the UN system on collective security is not a constitutional system, 
was not intended to be one, and therefore the International Court of Justice should not 
engage in judicial review of Security Council decisions. The legalists believe that the 
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UN Charter is a constitution, although limited in comparison to national constitutions, 
where the Security Council and the International Court of Justice have different but 
complementary roles. They also believe that the Security Council is bound by certain 
rules, and that the ICJ has to take the role of the ultimate legal gatekeeper and ensure 
that the Security Council adheres to these rules. 241 Among those supporting judicial 
review there are different opinions on whether the ICJ should be able to perform judicial 
review in Advisory Opinions only or also in contentious cases.242 This divisiveness 
among international lawyers is ever present. This is apparent in the amount of 
dissenting and separate opinions to the Lockerbie case before the ICJ, and it is still very 
much apparent also in the different conclusions by the Trial Chambers and Appeal 
Chambers of the international criminal tribunals, and the varied practice evolved by the 
tribunals over the years.  
 
International legal scholars have often referred to the Marbury v. Madison case as a 
model when discussing judicial review in international law. However, this is a limited 
view of the potential and nature of judicial review and should not form the only basis 
for what is understood by judicial review in international law.243 In addition to different 
definitions of judicial review in different legal systems, judicial review varies in its 
scope and effects.244 This is important to keep in mind because judges are extremely 
important in judicial review and the ones serving in international courts come from 
different legal backgrounds and bring with them their own legal traditions.245  
 
Following a comparative analysis of judicial review in different jurisdictions Alvarez 
has categorised different forms of judicial review into extremely deferential review, 
abstract review, and expressive review. Extremely deferential review entails a limited 
review where a court only takes a decision on very fundamental legal questions, for 
example it may examine if there are issues relating to abuse of power.246 In this form 
of review the court leaves it up to the executive to decide what effects the decision 
                                                 
241 Jose E. Alvarez, ‘Judging the Security Council’, American Journal of International Law, 90 (1996) 
1-39, at 2-3 
242 De Wet, Erika, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council (Hart Publishing: 
Portland, 2004)  at 127 - 128 
243 Jose E. Alvarez, ‘Judging the Security Council’, American Journal of International Law, 90 (1996) 
1-39 at 28 
244 Ibid at 25  
245 Ibid at 26 and 35 
246 Ibid at 26 
 38 
has.247 On the Security Council – ICJ axis this form of review entails that the ICJ would 
not review whether a certain situation is a threat to the peace (or an act of aggression), 
but it would restrict itself to consider whether the measures imposed by the Security 
Council would be against fundamental norms, such as humanitarian law.248 Abstract 
review entails a judgment by a court on the legality or constitutionality of an issue or a 
piece of legislation before it is passed by the legislative.249 As a form of review it has 
wide implications because it impacts legislation directly and in abstracto, without the 
kind of deliberations that are necessary when dealing with a ‘live’ judicial case.250 In 
the relationship between the ICJ and the Security Council this form of review would 
best be suited for advisory opinions251. 
 
Expressive review is a form of indirect review where the court may not declare the 
decision by the executive unlawful or ultra vires, and may even declare the decision by 
the executive lawful, but in doing so engages in a dialogue with the executive.252 This 
form of review is also typical where the court does not have legal authority to declare 
a decision by the executive null and void.253 For example, the ICJ may in its provisional 
measures or individual judges may in their dissenting, separate, or even majority 
opinions issue instructions or warnings to the Security Council on what it should have 
meant with a resolution and how it should act in future similar situations.254 This is the 
form of review that the ICJ applied in the decisions on provisional orders in the 
Lockerbie case.255 It is a form of judicial review that expresses the ‘hope’ of the judges 
or the court that the executive branch will take notice of their suggestions and 
voluntarily change its future practice.  
 
                                                 
247 Alvarez, Judging at 26-27 
248 Ibid at 27 
249 Ibid at 27. This form of review is applied by the constitutional courts of Germany and France. 
250 Ibid at 27 
251 According to Article 65 of the Statute of the ICJ ‘[t]he Court may give an advisory opinion on any 
legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations to make such a request.’. 
252 Alvarez, Judging at 28 and 30 
253 Ibid at 30 
254 Alvarez supra note xx at 29 
255 Ibid at 28. In their declarations, separate opinions, and dissenting opinions the ICJ Judges discussed 
for example the limits of the Security Council’s powers, the binding or non-binding nature of Security 
Council resolutions that may contain actions that are contradictory to international law, and ability and 
right of the ICJ to be concurrently seized of the same situation as the Security Council. 
 39 
It has also been argued that judicial review can be categorized in internal and external 
review.256 Internal review would imply that a court reviews a Security Council 
resolution for the purposes of its own legal order, and only renders its own measures 
unlawful, as the ECJ did in the Kadi case. External review would seem to imply that 
the court’s review has external effects by rendering the Security Council resolution 
invalid.257  
 
Hand in hand with a discussion on judicial review of decisions by executive organs by 
judicial organs goes a discussion on whether there are ‘justiciable’ matters that the 
courts should stick to and ‘non-justiciable’ matters that are better left for political 
organs to deal with.258 Courts have taken are different stance on the matter. The ICJ 
rejected the distinction in Hostages, Conditions of Admission of a State to the United 
Nations, and Border and Transborder Armed Actions259. The non-justiciability of 
Security Council decisions was one of the main arguments that the ICTR rejected (in 
text, but not in its practice) judicial review in Kanyabashi  and the ICTY Trial Chamber 
also accepted this division in Tadic.260 However, the ICTY Appeals Chamber 
adamantly rejected this definition and distinction of concepts.261 
 
3.2. International judicial review in practice 
 
In practice, international courts have engaged in judicial review of political UN 
decisions when exercising their judicial functions. The ICJ has considered and 
exercised judicial review in several contentious cases and advisory opinions.262 Also 
other courts have been faced with the question of whether or not to examine and/or 
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review Security Council decisions that directly affect the fundamental rights of 
individuals.263 The ad hoc international criminal tribunals were forced to examine the 
question of judicial review when their establishment under Chapter VII resolutions was 
questioned in their respective courtrooms. The current chapter intends to examine some 
of the case-law by these international courts. 
 
European courts have considered the dilemma of targeted Security Council sanctions 
conflicting with obligations arising from their respective legal orders.264 The European 
Court of Justice engaged in this form of discussion for example the Kadi and Al 
Barakaat265 case. The European Court of Human Rights examined the relationship 
between the Charter of the United Nations, the obligation to implement Security 
Council’s Chapter VII decisions and the obligations flowing from the European 
Convention on Human Rights in the Behrami and Saramati266 joint cases. While it 
would be extremely interesting to examine the practice by all of these courts in more 
detail and mirror them against the still quite hypothetical and potential engagement in 
judicial review of Security Council decisions by the International Criminal Court, this 
study is limited to the International Court of Justice, the international criminal tribunals, 
and the European Court of Justice. Examining judicial review by all of the 
aforementioned legal orders merits a more substantial study.  
3.2.1. International Court of Justice 
 
As submitted above in sub-chapter 3.2.1, the ICJ may consider any legal questions 
brought before it by States or UN organs. The ICJ has been seized with the question of 
whether or not to review UN decisions in for example Namibia267, Certain Expenses268 
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and Lockerbie. The Namibia269 stemmed from a Security Council resolution requesting 
an advisory opinion from the ICJ on the legal status of States remaining in Namibia 
despite an earlier Security Council resolution calling for South Africa to withdraw from 
Namibia.270 During the times of the League of Nations South Africa had been mandated 
the responsibility over Namibia, which the General Assembly had ended by resolution 
in 1996.271 During the proceedings South Africa claimed that the Security Council 
resolution requesting the advisory opinion had not been adopted lawfully and therefore 
the ICJ could not give its opinion. The ICJ concluded that ‘undoubtedly’ it did not have 
the power of review or appeal decisions by other organs of the UN, but ‘in the exercise 
of its judicial function’ it had to do so because of the claims of invalidity presented to 
it.272 In Certain Expenses the ICJ considered the legality of certain resolutions on 
peacekeeping missions273 and notably also Stated that each UN organ defines the limits 
of its own powers and thus exercises review of itself.274 
 
The most intriguing case is the Lockerbie case, wherein the ICJ considered whether 
Security Council decisions on extraditing terrorism suspects were in line with specific 
treaty provisions of the Montreal Convention.275 The ICJ held that it had the right to 
decide on the legality of the actions by the Security Council insofar as they were or 
were not incompatible with the Montreal Convention.276 In the order on provisional 
measures the ICJ Stated that it was ‘not at this stage called upon to determine 
definitively the legal effect of Security Council resolution 748’277 and therefore 
implicated that it may indeed have the right to do so at a later stage.278 Unfortunately, 
                                                 
269 The case examined a number of Security Council decisions on the legality of South Africa’s 
presence in Namibia. 
270 SC Res. 284 (1970) and SC Res. 276 (1970)  
271 Question of South West Africa, GA Res. 2145 (XXI), 27 October 1966 
272 Namibia at para 89 
273 Certain Expenses, supra note 137 
274 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), (Advisory 
Opinion), ICJ Reports (1962) xx  
275 The case concerned the bombing of PanAm flight 103, which fell over Lockerbie in Scotland. The 
United Kingdom and the United States requested the extradition of two suspects from Libya, which 
denied their applications and referred to the Montreal Convention and its provisions on aut dedere aut 
judicare (the obligation to extradite or prosecute). When Libya refused, the UK and the US threatened 
with measures imposed by the Security Council. The legal question concerned before the Court was 
whether the Security Council resolutions on the extraditions overthrew the rights and obligations set 
out in the Montreal Convention. 
276 Lockerbie (Preliminary Objections) at 36 
277 Lockerbie (Provisional Measures) at para 40 
278 Bernhard Graefrath, ‘Leave to the Court What Belongs to the Court – The Libyan Case’ 4 European 
Journal of International Law (1993) 184-205 at 185 
 42 
the ICJ never had the opportunity to take a final stand on this issue, as the case was 
removed from the docket by request of Libya.279 Nothing in the orders concludes with 
certainty that the ICJ would have reviewed Security Council resolution 748.280 Then 
again the ICJ accepting the case and noting that there was a real dispute and rejecting 
the objections by the United Kingdom that later Security Council resolutions had made 
the dispute moot, suggest that the ICJ would have had to take a stand on the matter.  
 
The case inspired a number of separate and dissenting opinions by the bench. Judge 
Rezek wrote in his separate opinion that the ICJ has ‘full jurisdiction to interpret and 
apply the law in a contentious case, even when the exercise of such jurisdiction might 
entail the critical scrutiny of a decision of another organ of the United Nations’.281 
Further, Rezek wrote that the ICJ is ‘the interpreter par excellence of the law and the 
natural forum for reviewing the acts of political organs in the name of the law’ for the 
reason that it is ‘impermeable to political injunctions’.282 Judge Schwebel came to 
another conclusion in his dissenting opinion. After conducting research into the 
preparatory works of the Charter he concluded that the ICJ is not, and was never meant 
to be, empowered to judicially review decisions by other UN organs.283 He opined that 
the ICJ is, in particular, not allowed to ‘overrule or undercut’ Security Council 
decisions made under Chapter VII.284 He also held that if the ICJ indeed had the power 
to ‘overrule, negate, modify’ Security Council decisions or merely hold them 
‘opposable’ this would then entail that the ICJ and not the Security Council would have 
primary authority over the maintenance of international peace and security.285  
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3.2.2. The International Criminal Tribunals 
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia286 (also referred to as 
the ‘ICTY’), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda287 (also referred to as the 
‘ICTR’) and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (also referred to as the ‘STL’) have all 
engaged in some form of judicial review of Security Council decisions. The cases 
concerned the legality of their establishment by Security Council resolutions.288 All 
defendants filed motions challenging the jurisdictions of the tribunals arguing that the 
Security Council lacked competence to establish international criminal tribunals under 
Chapter VII and that therefore, they had not been established by law.289 Since the 
Security Council had acted ultra vires, the resolutions establishing the tribunals were 
void and the tribunals had no jurisdiction over the accused.290 All the defendants argued 
that, ultimately, the legality of the tribunals was a question of the right to a fair trial 
before a tribunal established by law. The cases had slightly different outcomes in each 
of the tribunals and their chambers. 
 
In Tadic the ICTY Trial Chamber Stated that the question was not a matter of 
jurisdiction, but a matter of the legality of its creation and therefore a matter of judicial 
review of a decision by the Security Council.291 The accused, Dusko Tadic, a 
paramilitary member was later convicted of crimes against humanity and other crimes 
under the jurisdiction of the ICTY. The Trial Chamber held that it was not allowed to 
consider the legality of Security Council decisions as the ICTY was not a UN 
constitutional court and its jurisdiction was confined to criminal cases only.292 The Trial 
Chamber still discussed the issue, because dismissing the claims without comment 
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would have been improper as this was the first tribunal created in this manner.293 It 
noted that ‘although’ it was not its task to decide whether an act by the Security Council 
had been reasonable, ‘it is without doubt that [...] the Security Council did not 
arbitrarily’.294 The Security Council had used ‘informed judgment, after great 
deliberations’ that the situation in the former Yugoslavia was a threat to the peace, it 
continued. 295 The Trial Chamber noted that while there could be limits to the Security 
Council’s powers in the UN Charter, or more generally in international law, this 
limitation does not entail that a court would have the right to review Security Council 
resolutions.296 The Trial Chamber also noted that it is for the Security Council to 
determine in accordance with Article 39 whether a situation that justifies measures 
under Chapter VII of the Charter exists. 297 The legality of the Security Council’s action 
would depend on the validity of that determination, which was fact-based and raised 
‘political and non-justiciable issues’. It was therefore not possible for the Trial Chamber 
to review that question.298 The Trial Chamber still discussed whether creating an 
international tribunal had been an appropriate measure for the Security Council to take 
under Article 41 and agreed with the Security Council’s decision.299  
 
The Appeals Chamber came to a different conclusion and ruled that it had the right to 
review the Security Council resolution establishing the ICTY. It held that every 
international court is a ‘self-contained system’ because there is no centralised judicial 
system in international law and thus jurisdiction is a concept that entails every 
international court’s right to examine the legality of its establishment.300 It concluded 
that while criminal prosecutions were at heart in the ICTY’s original or primary 
jurisdiction, it also had a broader ‘incidental’ or ‘inherent’ jurisdiction derived directly 
from its judicial function.301 As a court it automatically had this ‘compétence de la 
compétence’ to determine its own jurisdiction and this right had not been limited in the 
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Statute of the ICTY.302 The Appeals Chamber therefore concluded that as the ICTY 
was allowed to examine its own legality, it was allowed examine the Security Council 
decision that had established it.303 The Appeals Chamber recognised that it was not 
acting as a ‘constitutional tribunal’ for UN decisions and that it could examine them 
solely for the purposes of ascertaining its inherent jurisdiction, but not for the purposes 
of its criminal jurisdiction.304 The Appeals Chamber did not consider that its 
jurisdiction was barred simply because of the question being ‘political’ or ‘non-
justiciable’.305 In fact, it referred to the Namibia case and rejected the categorisation: it 
found no support in contemporary international law for a division of issues into 
justiciable and non-justiciable issues.306  Yet, it noted that the wider the political 
discretion of the Security Council is, the narrower is the scope of review by the ICTY.307 
The Appeals Chamber also Stated that a determination of an act of aggression is closer 
to a legal determination than a determination of a threat to or breach of the peace.308  
 
Two years after the Appeals Chamber Decision in Tadic, the accused in the 
Kanyabashi309 case filed a motion challenging the jurisdiction of the ICTR. Joseph 
Kanyabashi, a former mayor of Butare, Rwanda was on trial for planning the genocide 
in Rwanda. In the jurisdictional motion the defense claimed inter alia that the Security 
Council had lacked competence to establish the ICTR under Chapter VII, that the 
Rwandan conflict did not pose a threat to international peace and security and therefore 
the Security Council had erred in acting under Chapter VII of the UN. 310 Further, the 
defense claimed that Article 41 of Charter did not give the authority to the Security 
Council to establish international courts.311  The Trial Chamber noted that determining 
the existence of a threat to international peace and security is within the exclusive 
competence of the Security Council312 as is the decision on whether or not to take action 
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under Chapter VII.313 The Trial Chamber further noted that while the Security Council 
is bound by Chapter VII of the Charter, it enjoys broad discretion when deciding what 
constitutes a threat to international peace and security. This assessment involves a 
consideration of ‘social, political and circumstantial factors’, which the ICTR could not 
balance ‘objectively’, and therefore this determination was by virtue ‘not justiciable’.314 
The Trial Chamber thus implicitly Stated that it could not consider the circumstances 
leading to the Article 39 determination made by the Security Council315, but then it 
went on to do that anyway. First, it Stated that it could ‘not accept’ the defence’s 
argument that the Rwandan situation did not constitute a threat to international peace 
and security, then it took ‘judicial notice’ of some the events316 that may have informed 
the Security Council’s determination, and finally it concluded that there was ‘no merit’ 
in the defence’s assertion that the Rwandan situation was not a threat to peace and 
security.317 Later in the decision, the Trial Chamber noted that the restoration of peace 
and security required that justice had been done and required swift action by the 
Security Council to guarantee that.318 It was a comment on the defence’s argument that 
the Security Council had no right to act under Chapter VII because international peace 
and security had already been restored by the time it established the ICTR. The Trial 
Chamber therefore commented on when a threat to international peace and security may 
end, even though it had already Stated that it was not possible for a court to decide or 
determine the existence of threats to peace and security. To borrow the aforementioned 
words of the ICTR itself in its mind-dwindling line of argumentation: it took ‘judicial 
notice’ of an issue that it had deemed ‘not justiciable’. Is it justiciable or not? Not clear. 
This is a great example of the ‘the thin red line’- kind of argumentation that 
international courts present on judicial review. The defence had an intention to appeal 
the decision, but withdrew the notice of appeal.319 
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The ICTY and the ICTR argued differently but arrived at the same conclusion.320  True, 
perhaps on examining the Security Council resolutions establishing their respective 
Statutes, but not entirely correct on their respective roles or powers to examine the 
determination made by the Security Council.  The ICTR Trial Chamber relied heavily 
on the ICTR Appeals Chamber decision in general, but not on the question concerning 
justiciable and not justiciable issues.321 It has been argued that the decision on the 
legality of the establishment of the international criminal tribunals should have been 
decided by the ICJ and not by the tribunals themselves.322   
 
In 2012, 18 years after Tadic and 15 years after Kanyabashi the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon adjudged in an almost identical case in Ayyash. The Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon was created by the Security Council to prosecute individuals responsible for 
the attack in Beirut in 2005 resulting in the death of former Lebanese Prime Minister 
Rafik Hariri and in the death or injury of other persons.323 Initially the Tribunal was 
meant to be created by an agreement between Lebanon and the UN, but as the Lebanese 
parliament never ratified the agreement, the Security Council entered the agreement 
into force by resolution 1757.324 In the still ongoing Ayyash situation the STL has 
indicted four individuals of their involvement in the assassination of Rafiq Hariri.325 
Ayyash and the three other accused submitted motions to the Trial Chamber 
questioning the legality of the tribunal’s establishment by the Security Council and not 
by Lebanese law.326 It ruled that it was ‘not vested with any power to review the actions 
taken by the Security Council.327 The STL Trial Chamber made a similar conclusion in 
Ayyash as the ICTY Trial Chamber had made in Tadic on inherent jurisdiction:  it Stated 
that there is a difference between the notions of legality and jurisdiction of a court: 
jurisdiction is a question of what matters a court can decide upon, legality questions the 
                                                 
320 Petculescu  
321 Morris, Virginia and Scharf, Michael P., ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’, 
Volume I (Transnational Publishers: New York, 1998) at 113 - 115 
322 Petculescu supra note xx at 191 
323 Article 1, Agreement between the United Nations and the Lebanese Republic on the establishment 
of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon, SC Res. 1757 (2007), Annex  
324 SC Res. 1757 (2007), op. 1 
325 The Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Case no. STL-11-01, Trial Chamber, Indictment (Public Redacted 
Version) (10 June 2011) 
326 Ayyash, Trial Chamber, at para. 15-16  
327 Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Case no. STL-11-01, Trial Chamber, Decision on the Defence 
Challenges to the Jurisdiction and Legality of the Tribunal (27 July 2012) (hereinafter also referred to 
as Ayyash Trial Decision), at para. 55 
 48 
court’s very foundation.328 The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunal 
excluded any challenges to the tribunal’s jurisdiction that were not explicitly related to 
its jurisdiction and did therefore not allow for challenges on its legality – similar rules 
had been introduced into the ICTY Rules after Tadic, the Tribunal noted.329 However, 
the Trial Chamber allowed the motion as it considered that the accused had a right to a 
fair trial in accordance with the Statute of the STL and that the notion of fair trial 
included the right to challenge on the legality of the court where an individual stood 
accused.330 The Trial Chamber also concluded that it had been established by law 
because the Security Council had the ‘constitutional authority’ to do so.331 The Security 
Council had established similar courts before and in doing so it exercised a similar right 
as a national parliament when establishing judiciaries.332 The Trial Chamber did not 
examine the determination of whether a breach of the peace had taken place in this 
situation, because it concluded that it lacked the competence to examine the Security 
Council determination.333 The accused appealed the decision.  
 
The STL Appeals Chamber continued on the restrictive path on judicial review that the 
Trial Chamber had chosen and took it several steps further.334 It concluded that it lacked 
the authority to review the Security Council’s resolution and that a determination by 
the Security Council on the existence of a threat to international peace and security is 
not subject to judicial review.335 The Appeals Chamber also noted that the UN Charter 
does not provide for judicial review within the UN system and that since it is unclear 
whether the ICJ can exercise judicial review, then certainly a court like the STL - 
outside of the UN system - is not able to engage in judicial review of Security Council 
decisions.336 It also rejected the notion of incidental jurisdiction carefully constructed 
by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadic and described it something the Tadic Appeal 
Decision had done because the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY had not 
                                                 
328 Ayyash Trial Decision, at para 29  
329 Ayyash Trial Decision, at para. 32 & 37 
330 Ayyash Trial Decision, at para. 38-40 
331 Ayyash Trial Decision, at para. 72 
332 Ayyash Trial Chamber at 71 
333 Ayyash Trial Decision at 71 
334 Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., Case no. STL-11-01, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Defence 
Appeals Against the Trial Chamber’s ‘Decision on the Defence Challenges to the Jurisdiction and 
Legality of the Tribunal’ (24 October 2012) (hereinafter also referred to as Ayyash, Appeals Decision) 
335 Ayyash Appeal Decision, para. 35 
336 Ayyash Appeal, paras 38-39 
 49 
defined the concept of jurisdiction.337 The decision by the Appeals Chamber has been 
harshly criticised as a ‘self-inflicted wound’ by a Court that already struggles with 
issues on its legitimacy.338 It has also been argued that scholars may ignore the decision 
by the Appeals Chamber and instead remember the Trial Chamber decision, which 
examined Security Council resolution 1757 while not explicitly confessing to judicial 
review339 It will be interesting to see what the impact of Ayyash will have on the 
discussion and practice on judicial review of Security Council decisions, in particular 
as it comes after a number of decisions that have taken the opposite approach.340 
 
3.2.3. The Court of Justice of the European Union 
  
One of the most interesting decisions and doctrines on judicial review of Security 
Council resolutions comes from the outside of the United Nations system. In 2005 – 
2008 the Court of Justice of the European Union considered the legal implications of 
Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on terrorism suspects. Security 
Council resolution 1267 (1999) established a sanctions regime for terrorism suspects 
after determining as a threat to international peace and security the Taleban’s failure to 
comply with previous demands that it cease being a sanctuary for terrorism. The EU 
implemented resolution 1267 first by a Council Common Position341 and later by a 
Regulation342. The targeted sanctions imposed by the Security Council and 
implemented into union law included flight bans and the freezing of assets.343 Kadi and 
Al Barakaat argued that their fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU treaties had been 
violated. At that time the UN sanctions regime was quite arbitrary. A state could 
propose names to be added to the lists and it was unclear what kind of evidence was 
                                                 
337 Ayyash Appeal Decision, paras 14 and 44 
338 Alvarez, Jose E., ‘Tadic Revisited – The Ayyash Decisions of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’, 
Journal of International Criminal Justice, 11 (2013), 291 - 302 
339 Ibid. 
340 Nikolova, Mariya and Ventura, Manuel J., ‘The Special Tribunal for Lebanon Declines to Review 
UN Security Council Action: Retreating from Tadic’s Legacy in the Ayyash Jurisdiction and Legality 
Decisions’, Journal of International Criminal Justice 11(3) (2013) 615 - 641 
341 Council Common Position 1999/727/CFSP of 15 November 1999 concerning restrictive measures 
against the Taliban OJ 1999 No. L 294/1  
342 Council Regulation (EC) No 337/2000 of 14 February 2000 concerning a flight ban and a freeze of 
funds and other financial resources in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan OJ 2000 No. L 43/1 
343 Council Common Position 1999/727/CFSP of 15 November 1999 concerning restrictive measures 
against the Taliban OJ 1999 No. L 294/1 
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required for it, if any. Individuals also had no way to seek judicial remedy for the 
decision.  
 
In Kadi the Court of First Instance (hereinafter CFI) decided that it did not have the 
jurisdiction to decide on the regulation in question and therefore, indirectly also the 
legality of a Security Council resolution.344 It argued that according to articles 25 and 
103 of the Charter of the UN, Charter obligations and binding UN resolutions supersede 
any obligations arising out of the EC Treaty. It also noted that as long as the resolutions 
were not in violation of jus cogens norms the member States were bound by them.345 
This was overturned by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice 
(hereinafter also referred to as ‘ECJ’) which held that it had jurisdiction to review EC 
measures giving effect to Security Council resolutions. It ruled that the EU regulations 
implementing the Security Council resolutions had violated the fundamental rights of 
the appellants and annulled the regulations.346 The ECJ held that EU law obliged it to 
review also the legality of EC acts that give effect to Chapter VII resolutions by the 
Security Council.347 It argued that while the resolution may be binding, States have the 
freedom to choose how to implement sanctions and thus the EU measures implementing 
sanctions may be subject to review.348  
 
Scholars disagree on whether the ECJ reviewed Security Council decisions. Some 
consider the judgment rebellious349 and criticise the ECJ for putting itself above 
international law.350 Some scholars argue that the ECJ erred, because article 25 of the 
UN Charter obliges the member States to comply with the resolutions and does not 
allow for such review.351 Others hold that by annulling a decision implementing a 
                                                 
344 Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-3649 at 217 and Case T-306/01, 
Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission, [2005] ECR II-3533  
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Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission, [2005] ECR II-3533 
346 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities [2008] 
ECR I-06351 (hereinafter ‘ECJ Kadi’)  
347 ECJ Kadi at 326 
348 ECJ Kadi at 298-299 
349 van Herik & Schrijver at 330 
350 Aust, supra note 211 at 297 
351 Larissa van den Herik and Nico Schrijver, ‘Eroding the Primacy of the UN System of Collective 
Security: The Judgment of the European Court of Justice in the Cases of Kadi and Al Barakaat’, 
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binding Security Council resolution the ECJ also questioned the legality of the said UN 
resolution.352 Others maintain that the ECJ did not review the legality of the Security 
Council resolutions, but rather the legality of the measures by which EC implemented 
the resolutions.353 If one would adhere to the notion of traditional judicial review, which 
renders the reviewed law or decision - paraphrasing Judge Schwebel –overruled, 
negated or modified as a result of the review354 then Kadi was not an exercise in judicial 
review. But Kadi had certain effects. It did not render the Security Council resolution 
null and void, but it ultimately led to a new procedure which aimed at safeguarding 
certain fundamental rights of individuals who ended up on the sanctions lists. As noted 
above, judicial review takes many forms. According to the Alvarez categorization one 
could perhaps place the Kadi judgment somewhere in between extremely deferential 
review and expressive review. What would make it extremely deferential is that in Kadi 
the ECJ relied on fundamental norms. However, it did not expressly review the primary 
decision: the Security Council resolution, but it reviewed an EU regulation, so thereby 
it is not purely an extremely deferential form of review. It most certainly fills the criteria 
of expressive review with the added bonus that it had practical consequences on the 
legal order it had examined: the Security Council’s sanctions regime. So it was not only 
a theoretical discussion between two institutions: in practice Kadi forced the UN to 
adjust its sanctions regime. Kadi (and prior and subsequent jurisprudence) by the EU 
courts is interesting for the purposes of this study because the EU and the ICC are two 
completely separate regimes from the UN system. Granted, the ICC has a very close 
relationship with the UN, and a very elaborated jurisdictional relationship with the 
Security Council, but it still is further separated from the Security Council than the ad 
hoc tribunals. It will therefore be interesting to see, whether, in the future, the ICC 
would adopt the practice developed by the tribunals or the ECJ. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
352 Anthony Aust, ‘Kadi: Ignoring International Legal Obligations’, International Organizations Law 
Review, 6 (2009) 293-298 at 294 
353Ramses A. Wessel, ‘The Kadi Case: Towards a More Substantive Hierarchy in International Law?’, 
International Organizations Law Review, 5 (2008) 323 – 327 at 326 
354 See chapter 3.2.1 
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4. DO THE ICC’S AGGRESSION PROVISIONS IMPLY JUDICIAL 
REVIEW? 
4.1. The determination puzzle 
 
As noted above in chapter 2.1.3 the UN system has defined an act of aggression in the 
Definition of Aggression. The Security Council is not bound by this definition, and it 
may determine any other acts of violence as aggressive acts, and it may also decide not 
to determine a clear case of aggression as aggression.355 In the Rome Statute, an act of 
aggression is defined in Article 8 bis of the Statute, which mirrors the Definition of 
Aggression. The main differences are that there are no open-ended clauses in the Rome 
Statute definition, that the ICC is bound by this definition and may not go beyond its 
scope, and that the crime of aggression is a leadership crime. We are left with two 
separate international organs which have a similar power, or task, but are bound by 
different legal orders: one by a legal order built for political decisions, the other by a 
legal order built for holding individuals criminally liable for crimes under international 
law. These two regimes are conflated by the jurisdictional provisions of the Rome 
Statute, which require a certain institutional discussion between the two organs. 
 
As noted above in chapter 2.2, in certain situations it is required that the Security 
Council ‘green lights’ an ICC investigation on a crime of aggression by making a 
determination on aggression or by not deferring the situation. In some situations the 
ICC may proceed without a determination by the Security Council. However, the ICC 
may never adjudge on a case concerning the crime of aggression without examining, 
and deciding on, whether an act of aggression has taken place, because the existence of 
an act of aggression is an element of the crime of aggression. An individual cannot be 
held liable for the crime of aggression unless an act of aggression has taken place. The 
ICC does not enjoy the luxury of remaining silent on acts of aggressions, not in the way 
that the Security Council does. Therefore, provided that the ICC will consider 
aggression situations in the future, in specific situations, unless the Security Council 
explicitly stipulates356 that an act of aggression has taken place, it is inevitable that the 
two organs will come to different decisions of whether an act of aggression has taken 
                                                 
355 For example, the Security Council took very different in defining armed violence by mercenaries as 
aggression in the Benin situation, but hesitated to do so in case of the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq. 
356 And unless the Security Council significantly changes its practice on determining acts of 
aggressions.  
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place. This will trigger not only an institutional discussion on the jurisdiction of the 
ICC to deal with a case on the crime of aggression but also a direct or indirect discussion 
on the existence of an act of aggression in a specific situation. This chapter seeks to 
examine whether this ‘discussion’ is a form of judicial review.  
 
4.2. Plausible scenarios under the Rome Statute  
 
In accordance with the amendments to the Rome Statute  there are only two scenarios 
where there is no potential conflict between the determinations on the existence of an 
act of aggression by the Security Council and the ICC: when the Security Council refers 
a situation to the ICC in a resolution and explicitly determines in this resolution that an 
act of aggression has taken place and when a State Party refers a situation to the ICC 
and there is a determination by the Security Council on the existence of an act of 
aggression and the ICC comes to the same conclusion in its judgment. However, the 
following situations may pose some difficulties:  
 
a) The Security Council refers a situation to the ICC in a resolution without 
determining the existence of an act of aggression, but by determining that there 
has been a breach of the peace or a threat to international peace and security. As 
the ICC is obliged to determine whether an act of aggression has taken place it 
may conclude that an act of aggression has not taken place (and thus there is no 
conflict with the Security Council’s determination that one of the other two 
situations under Article 39 took place) or it may conclude that an act of 
aggression did take place (and thus the ICC judgment and the Security Council 
resolution have different results). 
 
b) A State Party refers a situation to the ICC and there is a determination by the 
Security Council on the existence of an act of aggression. There may be a 
determination on the breach of the peace or on a threat to international peace 
and security. 
 
c) A State Party refers a situation to the ICC and there is no Security Council 
determination on the crime of aggression.  
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d) The ICC Prosecutor initiates a proprio motu investigation and there is no 
previous determination on aggression by the Security Council. There may be a 
determination on the breach of the peace or on a threat to international peace 
and security. 
 
As can be drawn from the scenarios above, the ICC can be faced with different 
situations as regards the crime of aggression. Bluntly put: either there is a Security 
Council determination on an act of aggression, there may be one in the future, or there 
is no determination at all, or a determination on a breach of the peace or a threat to 
peace. The ICC may act on a crime of aggression only when its jurisdiction has been 
triggered, when a case is admissible, and there are reasonable grounds for a criminal 
proceeding. The ICC would determine the existence of an act of aggression for its own 
purposes, for a criminal trial.357  
 
 While at the outset it may seem obvious to limit to considering the clash between a 
Security Council resolution on the existence/non-existence of an act of aggression and 
an ICC judgment on the culpability of an individual of a crime of aggression, this 
approach is too limited, as there are in fact are several moments in the proceedings 
where an organ of the ICC has to form an opinion on the existence of an act of 
aggression. For example, when:  
 
- The Prosecutor initiates an investigation based on a proprio motu 
finding or a State Party. 
 
- The Presidency assigns an investigation to a specific Pre-Trial Chamber. 
 
- The Pre-Trial Chamber allows the Prosecutor to proceed with a proprio 
motu investigation on the crime of aggression. 
 
- The Pre-Trial Chamber rules on the admissibility of the situation. 
 
- The Pre-Trial Chamber confirms an indictment presented by the 
Prosecutor. 
                                                 
357 Weisbord supra note 257 
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- The Appeals Chamber adjudges on an interlocutory appeal on a matter 
related to the pre-trial proceedings that are connected to the existence of 
an act of aggression (initiation of an investigation, admissibility, 
indictment, etc.)  
 
- The Trial Chamber renders a judgment on the individual criminal 
responsibility of a person for a crime of aggression. 
 
- The Appeals Chamber considers an appeal on the judgment of the Trial 
Chamber. 
This list does not include decisions which may be equally interesting, for example 
decisions on the assignation of defence counsels, participation of victims, protection of 
witnesses, or reparations for victims – which may contain some considerations on, not 
necessarily the culpability of a person for the crime of aggression, but on the plausibility 
or the ‘reasonable grounds’ that a crime of aggression, and therefore also an act of 
aggression, took place. The notion of ‘a determination of the existence of an act of 
aggression’ may be a too strong for many of these procedural moments, but they require 
that an organ of the Court has to form an opinion, however vague, on whether it is 
possible that an act of aggression has taken place and that it is therefore reasonable for 
it to proceed with its tasks in relation to the situation at hand. There are different 
thresholds for the organs to proceed with the afore-mentioned decisions. For example, 
in a proprio motu investigation, the Prosecutor shall first analyse the ‘seriousness’ of 
the information received on a situation and if the Prosecutor concludes that there is ‘a 
reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation’ a request for an authorization of this 
investigation shall be submitted to the Pre-Trial Chamber.358 If the Pre-Trial Chamber 
agrees that there is ‘a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation’ it shall 
authorize the investigation.359 In accordance with Article 17 of the Rome Statute, the 
Court shall consider the admissibility of the case, depending on whether there are issues 
of complementarity or ne bis in idem to consider, or whether the case is not of sufficient 
gravity for the Court.360 The Trial Chamber shall base its judgment on the facts and 
                                                 
358 Article 15(3) of the Rome Statute  
359 Article 15(4) of the Rome Statute 
360 Article 17 of the Rome Statute 
 56 
circumstances presented in the charges according to Article 74 of the Statute and the 
individual criminal responsibility based the general principles of (international) 
criminal law provided for in Article 20 and Part 3 of the Statute (for example ne bis in 
idem, nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege, non-retroactivity of the law, 
irrelevance of official capacity, command responsibility, superior orders). When 
considering the merits of a case, the ICC is bound to apply the law within the limits of 
Article 21 of the Rome Statute. According to Article 21, it shall in the first place apply 
the Rome Statute, the Elements of Crimes, and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
In the second place it may consider applicable treaties and the principles and rules of 
international law. Failing that, it may apply general principles of law derived from 
national legal systems. Furthermore, the ICC is bound to apply the law in accordance 
with human rights.361 All the above-mentioned deliberations and potential decisions by 
the different organs of the ICC are anchored in the Rome Statute, its rules and 
regulations, and its practice on these provisions. It has been suggested that the current 
framework in the Rome Statute on the Pre-Trial Chamber do not currently provide for 
all the potential functions that it would have to take on in a situation concerning a crime 
of aggression.362 The Statute or the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the 
Regulations of the Court would have to be amended accordingly.363 
 
There are also different options on how the Security Council could act in the situation 
for its own purposes and for the purposes of the jurisdiction of the ICC.364 The Security 
Council could make a determination that an act of aggression exists but it could refrain 
from referring the situation to the ICC, which either could have jurisdiction of the 
situation due to a proprio motu investigation, or due to a State Party referral. 365  The 
Security Council could refer a situation to the ICC under Article 15 ter of the Rome 
Statute without making a specific determination that an act of aggression has taken 
place.366 Security Council determinations on acts of aggression have varied 
substantially and textually.367 For example: the Security Council could refrain from 
                                                 
361 Article 21, Rome Statute 
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identifying the aggressor State368 or the victim State, or it could identify either as a 
territory without proper Statehood.369 In its determination, the Security Council could 
identify different forms of aggression: it could refrain from identifying any specific acts 
as aggression, or it could identify specific conduct as acts of aggression.370 When 
determining specific conduct as aggression it could determine an act as aggression that 
has not been defined as such in any document, it could revert to  the UN  Definition of 
Aggresion, or to the more restricted definition Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute.371 Any 
of these could either be compatible or incompatible with the Article 8 bis definition of 
an act of aggression. 
 
The reports of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression suggest that a 
Security Council determination on aggression would most likely be a resolution under 
Chapter VII of the Charter.372 This would also follow the logic of the Rome Statute, 
which currently provides that the Security Council acts under Chapter VII when 
deciding on referrals and deferrals for the purposes of the ICC.373 In order to proceed 
with an ICC situation, which falls under Chapter VII, the Security Council must 
therefore determine whether any of the conditions enumerated in Article 39 exist, be it 
a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression.374 Such a resolution 
may also contain a decision on sanctions or an authorisation for the use of force and 
could contain direct obligations for States to take certain action. It is a political 
determination, made for political purposes and not necessarily anchored in law.375 The 
Security Council is not bound by the law beyond the scope of the Charter or peremptory 
norms when it makes its determination, although it is bound by the principles and 
purposes of the UN Charter.376 A determination by the Security Council does not 
indicate a violation of international law, it is rather a preliminary exclamation for 
political purposes.377  
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Since the ICC and the Security Council would make different determinations (or in the 
case of the different ICC organs: direct or indirect deliberations, conclusions, or 
opinions) on the same situation they could potentially come to very different 
conclusions. There could be two determinations of the same incident, one political 
determination by the Security Council under Article 39 of the Charter and one legal 
determination made by the Trial Chamber of the ICC under Article 8 bis of the Rome 
Statute.378 One would bind the organs, parties to the situations or cases, or individuals 
otherwise connected to the criminal trial and the other would possibly bind States. 
While the afore-mentioned decisions by the ICC are not likely to exclaim a Security 
Council decision ultra vires a conflicting approach to the situation by the different 
organs might have practical consequences. They could potentially create conflicting 
obligations for States, especially in situations where a decision requires the cooperation 
of States, such as the execution of an arrest warrant.379 At the least, the situation would 
lead to discussions on the legitimacy of the decision(s) by one of the organs. 
 
 
4.3. Different forms of international judicial review and the Rome 
Statute provisions 
 
As noted above in chapter 3.1, judicial review may be categorized into extremely 
deferential review, abstract review, and expressive review. Abstract review entails a 
pre-review of future legislative acts does not seem to applicable to this situation as there 
is no such relationship between the ICC and the Security Council where the Security 
Council would request the ICC for an opinion on its future decisions.  
 
Extremely deferential review, wherein a court takes a stand on a fundamental legal 
question relating to the consequences of a decision, may also not seem to be applicable 
in this situation. This is due to the fact that the concept of extremely deferential review 
is at least currently defined to exclude the possibility of reviewing the Security 
Council’s determination under Article 39: it would only review the legality of the 
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consequences of that decision.  It is worthwhile to note that this is the form of judicial 
review that the ICTY and the ICTR engaged in, because the tribunals did not open up 
the Security Council’s determination on whether the situations in former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda constituted threats to the peace, but both courts specifically discussed 
whether the consequences and the actions taken on the account of that determination 
had been lawful. 
 
Expressive judicial review is a form of dialogue between a court and the executive. 
While the court may not have the ability or willingness to judge an executive decision 
as unlawful, it may through its decisions and judgments send messages or cues to the 
executive on how the court views the law and the executive’s powers or its 
interpretation of the law.380 This is the form of judicial review that the International 
Court of Justice has engaged in. This was specifically the case when a number of 
dissenting and separate opinions in the Lockerbie case commented on the Security 
Council’s powers in relation to obligations under international law. This is also the form 
that a judicial review by the ICC could perhaps take. When the ICC would make its 
own decisions and determinations on acts of aggression it would either directly or 
indirectly at the same time send messages to the Security Council on a legal framework 
for how to determine the existence of acts of aggression, what acts would amount to 
acts of aggression, and what kind of evidence it uses to determine the existence of acts 
of aggression. The ICC would very likely also be faced with defense motions on the 
reasons why a person being accused for the crime of aggression but maintaining his or 
her innocence may consider that the act of aggression he/she stands accused for was in 
fact legal use of force and not an act of aggression. Thus, the ICC could hypothetically 
contribute to the development on judicial practice on the concepts of self-defense, 
humanitarian interventions, and the responsibility to protect. 
 
As noted above, the judgments by the EU courts led to a certain ‘discussion’ between 
the EU and the UNSC, as the latter was forced to change its practice on sanctions. It is 
for this reason that the EU judgments are interesting for the purposes of this study. It 
may well be that the ICC would, in future decisions on aggression, engage in similar 
‘review’ or discussion with the Security Council on the notion of aggression. For 
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example, in a situation where the Security Council and the ICC are seized with the same 
situation, the ICC may come to a different conclusion on whether an act of aggression 
has taken place or not. This could then lead to the Security Council taking the ICC 
decision into account the next time when it was seized with a matter concerning 
aggression. The ICC’s potential future practice on aggression might also impact the 
determinations on aggression by the Security Council. However, there are a few things 
to take into consideration. The Security Council was practically forced to change its 
practice on sanctions because the EU Member States were unable to implement its 
resolutions after the Kadi judgment. A similar scenario would not exist with the ICC. 
On the contrary, the roles are completely opposite when compared to the EU and the 
Security Council in Kadi. The Security Council depended on the EU Member States to 
implement its decisions. As was established above the ICC is dependent on the Security 
Council for its cooperation on referring situations to the ICC, on not deferring situations 
from the ICC and for overseeing State cooperation with the ICC. In this context, the 
ICC is the ‘prisoner’ of its own formalised relationship with the Security Council. The 
EU has no such direct, formalised relationship with the Security Council. Based on 
Kaadi one could then make two conclusions. One, in theory, it could be possible for 
the ICC to engage in a ‘review’ or dialogue with the Security Council on matters 
relating to aggression that might push the Security Council to different future practices. 
Two, in practice, the roles are turned for the ICC and therefore one could make the 
assumption that as the ICC is in part dependent on the goodwill of the Security Council 
it might not be too enthusiastic about pushing the Security Council towards changes.  
 
Judicial review in the international legal order is not necessarily spelled out as judicial 
review, nor does it necessarily entail the same outcome as judicial review in a national 
system.  Even in the US legal system, where judicial review has a long tradition, it still 
evolves to this day. Therefore it will also continue to involve in international law and 
this new creation in the Rome Statute may also turn out to be a new form of judicial 
review.381 
 
Would a determination on aggression be a ‘justiciable’ or a ‘non-justiciable’ issue? 
While there undoubtedly is a ‘quasi-judicial’ dimension to the work of the Security 
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Council, it is an inherently political body.382 the Security Council is not directly bound 
by law when it determines aggression any more than when determining any of the other 
situations, nor is it bound by the Definition on Aggression, even if it is considered to 
represent customary international law.383 For the purposes of the Security Council the 
definition is a mere recommendation, which in itself already recognises that the 
Security Council may define any acts as aggression.384 The Security Council is more 
guided by its political considerations than legal argumentation.385 It may therefore very 
well determine aggressive acts as breaches of the peace or perhaps even threats to the 
peace – or it may decide not to do anything at all.386 In practice, this is exactly what the 
Security Council has done. It has determined the existence of an act of aggression only 
in five situations387 and has refrained from determining aggression even in obvious 
situations, such as the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,388 instead the Council referred to 
the invasion as a breach of international peace and security.389 The Council did this 
even if the Definition of Aggression specifically provides that an invasion is an act of 
aggression.390  
 
The Security Council lacks a clear and consistent practice on its determinations on 
aggression.391 It is not a given that the Security Council will expressly make its 
determination known by stating that ‘State x has committed an act of aggression by 
doing y’. For example, in many of the resolutions relating to the South Rhodesian war, 
aggression was mentioned only in the preambular paragraphs and not even explicitly 
as acts of aggression in accordance with Article 39. These paragraphs mentioned 
‘aggressive acts’, whereas the operative paragraphs mentioned violence in ‘flagrant 
violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity’ of the countries.  The Security 
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Council has also used different terminology to either describe acts of aggression as ‘acts 
of aggression, ‘aggressive acts’, ‘act of armed aggression’ or to qualify acts of 
aggression with adjectives such as ‘persistent’, ‘wanton’, or ‘premeditated’ or by 
stating its concern with the express ‘gravity’ of a particular act of aggression. It has also 
specifically used the term ‘mercenary aggression’ in two situations.392  
 
4.4. Intention and purpose of the drafters of the Rome Statute 
 
It is worthwhile to discuss the objective of the drafters of the Rome Statute in trying to 
seek an answer to whether judicial review, in some form, was an issue that the drafters 
had in mind while negotiating the provisions on the crime of aggression. As the final 
Articles on the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute are the outcome of years of 
work by the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, a closer look at the 
group’s discussions on this topic is merited. However, it is first in order to take a look 
at whether and how this topic was dealt with at the decades-long negotiations on the 
ICC. 
 
The 1994 ILC Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court envisioned that a future 
permanent international criminal court would have jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression. However, the ILC suggested that the ICC could commence proceedings on 
a crime of aggression only if the Security Council had made a previous determination 
that a State had committed an act of aggression.393 In the commentary on the draft, the 
ILC held that ‘criminal responsibility of an individual for an act or crime of aggression 
necessarily presupposes that a State had been held to have committed aggression, and 
such a finding would be for the Security Council acting in accordance with Chapter VII 
of the Charter of the United Nations to make’.394 The Draft Statute does not mention 
whether such a determination would have been binding on the ICC, nor does it mention 
judicial review. 
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The negotiations continued first in the Ad Hoc Committee in 1995 and later in the 
Preparatory Committee in 1996-1998, ‘with a view to preparing a widely acceptable 
consolidated text of a convention for an international criminal court’. 395 No agreement 
was reached on the conditions to exercise jurisdiction over aggression. For instance the 
United States was of the view that the illegality of an act of aggression would have to 
be determined by the Security Council396, while many others saw no role for the 
Security Council.397 As a compromise, the initial proposal by the ILC was kept in the 
drafts submitted to the Rome Conference398 and a reference was added to the ICC’s 
independence in determining the criminal responsibility of an individual for 
aggression.399 
 
The draft submitted to the Rome Conference therefore read as follows:  
 
‘the Court may not exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime of aggression 
unless the Security Council has first determined under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations that the State concerned has committed an act of 
aggression. A determination by the Security Council shall not be interpreted as 
in any way affecting the independence of the Court in its determination of the 
criminal responsibility of any person concerned.’ 400 
 
Attempts to reach compromises were made. One proposal suggested that the ICC would 
have an obligation to refer a potential case concerning a crime of aggression to the 
Security Council for a determination on an act of aggression. Should the Council fail 
to do so, the Court could proceed with its investigation.401 This proposal was however 
not considered in detail.402 In order to secure the necessary backing for the Rome 
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Statute, aggression had to be included somehow.403  At the very last minute, a 
compromise was reached by including the crime within the ICC’s jurisdiction de jure 
but limiting its exercise de facto until a definition and the conditions to exercise 
jurisdiction were agreed upon.404  
 
The Final Act of the Rome Conference created a Preparatory Commission (hereinafter 
also referred to as the ‘PrepCom’) to prepare for a future establishment of the ICC and 
among other things continue the negotiations on aggression. 405  The PrepCom was to 
prepare proposals for a provision on aggression and submit them to the Assembly of 
States Parties at a Review Conference, ‘with a view at arriving at an acceptable 
provision on the crime of aggression.’406  The negotiations on aggression took place in 
the Working Group on the Crime of Aggression until the ICC was established in 2002. 
During three years and 10 sessions the group considered several proposals407, yet it 
failed to reach agreement as most States maintained their previous positions.408 An 
early discussion paper by the Coordinator of the Working Group highlighted that the 
Security Council exercises its function to determine the existence of an act of 
aggression, whereas the ICC decides on individual criminal responsibility for the crime 
of aggression. As a ‘crime of aggression presupposes the existence of an act of 
aggression’, the respective roles of the Security Council and the ICC had to be 
consoled.409 The paper also noted that a decision of the Security Council or a 
recommendation by the General Assembly on aggression should not be interpreted as 
in any way affecting the independence of the Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction 
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with regard to the crime of aggression.410 The paper suggested a solution for those 
prospective situations where the Security Council would fail to agree on a 
determination on aggression. Either the ICC could proceed with its investigation after 
a set time-limit or it could turn to other organs of the UN and request a determination 
by the General Assembly or the International Court of Justice.411 However, as opposed 
to the previous paper, it did not take note of whether or not the ICC would be bound by 
such a decision. While no agreement was reached, the outcome of the working group 
was solidified into a discussion paper proposed by the Coordinator, which contained a 
draft article with square-bracketed options for the most disputed parts, including those 
concerning the ICC’s jurisdiction.412 
 
In 2005 the Special Working Group held that a Security Council determination would 
only be a procedural question and not binding on the ICC. The report notes that should 
the decision on aggression be binding on the ICC it would have a ‘drastic impact’ on 
the rights of the defendant.413 The report provides that the Special Working Group 
based its discussion on the 2002 Coordinator’s discussion paper.414  However, the 2002 
paper does not contain any references to this end. The only public paper by the 
Coordinator referring to whether a determination would be binding on the ICC is the 
paper from 1999.415 In addition, the review of the coordinator’s paper in 2007, which 
‘follows the format’ of the 2002 paper, makes no such reference.416 It makes a 
difference, because the 1999 paper only suggests that certain Security Council 
determinations would not be binding on the ICC and this was not reflected in the 
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proposal submitted to the Review Conference in 2010, which suggests that the ICC 
would not be bound by any determination.417  
 
Paragraph 11 of the draft proposal in the 1999 paper provides that ‘the decision of the 
Security Council under paragraph 5 above or a recommendation by the General 
Assembly under paragraph 8 above shall not be interpreted as in any way affecting the 
independence of the Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction with regard to the crime of 
aggression.’418 Paragraphs 5 and 8 of the 1999 paper both refer to situations where the 
ICC has received a complaint concerning a crime of aggression and the Security 
Council has not determined the existence of an act of aggression in that specific 
situation.419 The paper therefore seems to suggest that the ICC would be bound by 
‘ordinary’ determinations on aggression, but that it would not be bound by the Security 
Council’s determination if the ICC receives a complaint by a State and specifically 
requests a determination from the Security Council.420 Perhaps this was constructed in 
order to ensure that the Security Council would not interfere with aggression cases 
referred to the ICC by States.  
 
In 2006, expressing a will to safeguard the right to a fair trial, participants of the Special 
Working Group supported the notion that the ICC would not be bound by a Security 
Council determination on aggression.421 The report refers to the rights of the accused 
enshrined in Article 67 of the Rome Statute and notes that defendants should always be 
able to challenge the Prosecutor’s case in its entirety, including also the element of the 
crime which consists of the State act of aggression.422 Further, the report notes that the 
ICC should be able to examine possible new evidence on aggression also after a 
determination has been made by the Security Council.423 According to the report some 
participants were vary of giving such a role to the ICC as States could then, at the court 
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proceedings, dispute whether an act of aggression had taken place.424 It is a double-
edged sword: on the one hand it would have significant consequences on legitimacy if 
the Security Council had already taken measures under Chapter VII against a State that 
would later be in this manner ‘indirectly’ acquitted before the ICC. On the other hand, 
it would be inconceivable to think that a court of law would adjudge on a matter based 
on old ‘evidence’ (the known facts forming the basis for the Security Council 
resolution) if new, admissible  evidence is presented to it. 
 
At the resumed fifth session of the Special Working Group in early 2007, some 
delegations noted once more the rights of defendants and voiced that the ICC should 
not ‘in any event’ be bound by a Security Council determination of an act of 
aggression.425 At the Princeton inter-sessional meeting of the Special Working Group 
later in 2007 ‘it was recalled’ that a Security Council determination on aggression 
would not bind the ICC.426  It was further noted, that a definition on aggression in the 
Rome Statute would not bind the Security Council. Consequently, it was ‘emphasized 
and generally agreed that, in turn, the Court was not bound by a determination of an act 
of aggression by the Security Council or any other organ outside the Court’. The report 
further States that both organs have autonomous and complementary roles and that 
therefore both institutions should have compatible rules on the determination of an act 
of aggression.427 The report of the sixth session of the Special Working Group later that 
year notes, again that ‘there was agreement’ that the provisions in the Rome Statute on 
aggression would not bind the Security Council and therefore the ICC would not be 
bound by a determination of an act of aggression by the Security Council or any other 
organ.428  
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At the resumed sixth session in June 2008 it was ‘recalled’ that the SWGCA had already 
agreed in the past that a determination of aggression by another institution would not 
be binding ‘for the purpose of individual criminal prosecution’. At the meeting, it was 
suggested that ‘this important consideration should be explicitly reflected in the text.’429 
Later that year an informal note on the work programme of the seventh session 
suggested that delegations further discuss whether such a reference should be placed 
into a draft provision. 430 The reference was added to the next revision of the 
Chairman’s paper in February 2009431 and then finally into the proposal to the Review 
Conference.432   
 
The Liechtenstein proposal introduced a separate Article for the conditions to exercise 
jurisdiction and suggested that if the Security Council had made a determination on 
aggression, the ICC Prosecutor may proceed with the investigation on the crime of 
aggression.433 While the Special Working Group did not recognise an exclusive role for 
the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security, it came to 
terms with realpolitik and recognised that the Council would have to play a role.434 The 
proposal recognised that there would only be a predicament if no such determination 
exists and only if the Security Council would not be able to arrive at such a decision.  
 
Two alternatives were proposed for the situation where no Security Council 
determination existed.435 One alternative suggested that the Prosecutor could not at all 
proceed with an investigation on a crime of aggression, unless the Security Council had 
determined the existence of an act of aggression. This represented the approach by the 
ILC Draft Statute.436  Another alternative suggested that the Prosecutor could proceed 
with an investigation on aggression even without a prior determination by the Security 
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Council, if the Council requested the Prosecutor do so in a resolution adopted under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. This ‘procedural go-ahead’ would 
allow for the Security Council to authorise ICC investigations on the crime of 
aggression without specifically making a determination of aggression. This would cater 
for those situations where it is reasonably clear that an act of aggression has taken place, 
but the Security Council is unable or unwilling to arrive to that conclusion.437 In reality, 
this option did not differ much from an Article 13 referral by the Security 
Council.438Another alternative proposed that the Prosecutor could proceed with the 
investigation if the Security Council failed to produce a determination within 6 months 
after he/she had informed the Council of his investigation on the crime of aggression. 
This alternative provided for a procedure for the ICC to proactively seek a 
determination on aggression from the Security Council. When the ICC Prosecutor 
intends to investigate a situation concerning the crime of aggression he or she should 
inform the Secretary-General of the UN.439  The Security Council is then given a 
timeframe of six-months to react. If it fails to produce a determination, the Prosecutor 
could go on with the investigation according to option one. The Council would thereby 
‘green-light’ the ICC’s investigation by its own inaction. Nothing would bar the 
Security Council from ‘red-lighting’ the investigation in accordance with Article 16 of 
the Rome Statute.440 Option two introduced a confirmation proceeding based on the 
proprio motu system provided for already in Article 15 of the Rome Statute.441 
According to this procedure, the Pre-Trial Chamber would confirm the Prosecutor’s 
initiation of an investigation into a crime of aggression if the Security Council fails to 
produce a determination within six months. Paragraph 4 of the proposal provided that 
‘[a] determination of an act of aggression by an organ outside the Court shall be without 
prejudice to the Court’s own findings under the Statute’.442 It is understood that this 
paragraph entails that the ICC would not be bound by a Security Council determination 
on aggression.443 Paragraph 5 of the proposal provides that the Article on the conditions 
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to exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression do not affect the ICC’s jurisdiction 
over the other crimes within its jurisdiction.444 
 
In conclusion, the Special Working Group considered that the ICC would not be bound 
by a Security Council determination on aggression due to the need to safeguard fair 
trial rights of the accused and because the Security Council would not be bound by the 
ICC’s determination. One reading of earlier Special Working Group discussions 
suggests that the group came to this conclusion in order to protect the rights of the 
accused.445 As the State act of aggression is an element of the crime of aggression, it 
was felt imperative to give an opportunity for the defendant to contest that claim and 
for the ICC to decide on that basis whether or not a State act of aggression had taken 
place.446 
 
The Special Working Group’s discussions are anchored in the understanding that a 
Security Council decision on aggression is a political conclusion simply deciding 
whether or not a State has committed an act of aggression, whereas the ICC would 
decide on an individual’s criminal responsibility for the crime of aggression. It is a 
certain understanding of different regimes, of separation of political and judicial 
powers, and perhaps of non-justiciable and justiciable issues. However, the preparatory 
work does not mention the notion ‘judicial review’ in this regard. The materials only 
give guidance on whether the ICC would be bound by the decision. However, as 
established above in sub-chapter 3.1, the concept of judicial review in international law 
is broader than this and it is not limited to whether or not a court is bound by a Security 
Council decision or whether or not a court can or will declare a Security Council 
decision null and void. It also extends to discussing a resolution – and this is something 
that this study claims that the ICC may be forced to do in its practice. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
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As examined in sub-chapter 3.2, other international courts have engaged in judicial 
review of Security Council decisions. The review has been limited from the point of 
view of this study, since all the judgments have affirmed the Chapter VII powers of the 
Security Council. None of the courts have had explicit jurisdiction to determine the 
existence of an act under Article 39, none of them have explicitly opened such a 
determination for examination, and thus none of the courts have decided differently 
than the Security Council on an Article 39 determination.447 Yet, since other courts 
have engaged in judicial review it could be argued that whatever form of institutional 
dialogue the ICC and the Security Council may have on aggression in the future, it may 
perhaps be considered as judicial review, at least according to what is understood with 
the notion of judicial review in international law today. All the courts examined in this 
study share certain similarities. All are independent judicial bodies and none of them 
have a formal competence to review the legality of Security Council decisions. All the 
courts administer justice, some settle disputes between States, between States or 
international organisations, and some of them decide on the criminal liability of 
individuals. Yet, the ICJ, the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC are by virtue very different. 
The ICJ, the ICTY and the ICTR are directly part of the United Nations. The ICJ is a 
separate organ of the UN and not succumbed to the powers of the political organs to 
the UN. The ICTY and the ICTR were established as separate entities under the 
Security Council. The SCL was established by an agreement between the United 
Nations and the Lebanon. Further, the ICTY, the ICTR, the STL, and the ICC are 
restricted to criminal jurisdictions and the former three have only been concerned with 
the legality of Security Council resolutions in connection with the cases cited above. 
Out of these courts, the ICJ has the broadest jurisdiction to interpret Charter 
obligations.448 
 
Arguments favouring judicial review by the ICJ are based on its role as the principal 
judicial organ of the UN and a claim that the Charter does not place any organ above 
the other.449 The ICC is already succumbed to the decision-making power of the 
Security Council in accordance with Article 16. The Security Council may at any time 
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defer the investigations or prosecutions of the ICC if it so decides under Chapter VII. 
This already existing relationship between the ICC and the Security Council places the 
ICC in a different position from the other international courts, which are not directly 
affected or bound by Security Council decisions. Indeed, as noted above in sub-chapter 
2.3, the ICC was established within an international order that recognises a system of 
collective security where the Security Council has authority under Chapter VII.450 In 
addition, Article 103, which affirms the primacy of the UN Charter, places the ICC 
under the hierarchy of the UN whereas no such hierarchy exists between the ICJ and 
the Security Council. Therefore, any conclusion which would State that the ICC could 
review Security Council decisions cannot be based solely on the ICJ’s plausible power, 
or emerging power, to review Security Council decisions.  
 
Neither can it be based on the Tadic decision. As was noted above in sub-chapter 3.2.2 
the ICTY argued that it had the right to review a Security Council decision because it 
related to its inherent jurisdiction and not its primary jurisdiction over criminal cases. 
As an act of aggression determined by the Security Council would be an element of the 
crime of aggression a review of that determination would inevitably be part of the ICC’s 
primary and substantive jurisdiction. Therefore one could not base the ICC’s ability to 
judicial review on the Tadic argument alone. There are also those who consider that the 
ICC should not engage in judicial review of Security Council decisions, because 
contradictory decisions may undermine the authority of both the ICC and the Security 
Council.451 It has also been Stated that the maintenance of peace and the maintenance 
of law are not necessarily the same thing452, insinuating that perhaps the ICC should 
stay far away from any ideas involving judicial review.  
 
How does this relate to the notion that Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII 
are binding on States, based Articles 25 and 103 of the Charter.453 This concerns all 
Chapter VII decisions, not only the ones relating to enforcement measures. Whether a 
specific resolution is binding can also be derived from the language of the resolution, 
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the discussion on before adoption, the provisions invoked in the resolutions and ‘all 
general circumstances’.454 Some consider that neither the UN Charter nor the Rome 
Statute suggest that the ICC would be bound by a Security Council determination.455  It 
has also been argued that the Security Council does not have primary or exclusive 
competence to rule on the criminal liability of individuals on the crime of aggression. 
Therefore a decision on aggression by the Security Council would have no other impact 
on the ICC than perhaps serve as evidence at a trial.456 
 
Yet, a ‘de facto subordinate relationship’ between the Security Council and the ICC is 
already built into the Rome Statute.457 As has been established above in Chapter 3, the 
ICC may currently become seized by a Security Council decision either by a referral of 
a situation, a deferral of an investigation or prosecution or by a decision on enforcement 
measures if a State does not cooperate with the ICC. To date the Security Council has 
passed three resolutions directly affecting the ICC, the Darfur referral and the two ‘pre-
emptive deferrals’.458 Article 13 referrals are not binding upon the ICC, as the 
Prosecutor may decide that there are not sufficient grounds to open an investigation.459  
 
Security Council deferrals under Article 16 of the Rome Statute are by their nature 
different and binding on the ICC. Article 17(2) of the Relationship Agreement between 
the ICC and the UN provides as follows: ‘When the Security Council adopts under 
Chapter VII of the Charter a resolution requesting the Court, pursuant to Article 16 of 
the Statute, not to commence or proceed with an investigation or prosecution, this 
request shall immediately be transmitted by the Secretary-General to the President of 
the Court and the Prosecutor.  The Court shall inform the Security Council through the 
Secretary-General of its receipt of the above request and, as appropriate, inform the 
Security Council through the Secretary-General of actions, if any, taken by the Court 
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in this regard.’460  The wording of the Article is interesting, as it States that the ICC 
shall inform the Security Council of its receipt of the Security Council’s ‘request’ under 
Article 16 and that the ICC shall inform of ‘its actions, if any’ taken in this regard. The 
Relationship Agreement seems to suggest that an Article 16 decision is a mere request, 
not a command, to halt investigations or prosecutions. Furthermore, it also suggests that 
the ICC may itself decide whether or not to take any action after such a request by the 
Security Council. In reality, a deferral under Article 16 is binding on all the organs of 
the ICC.461 Perhaps the drafters of the relationship agreement did not want to interfere 
with the provisions in the Rome Statute and therefore drafted the practical provisions 
on Article 16 in the Relationship Agreement cautiously. The power to review Security 
Council decisions on aggression would not change the power of the Council to defer 
ICC situations. 
 
Judicial independence is not vested in the power of review alone. A conflicting decision 
by the ICC on aggression might wreak havoc on collective security in particular if the 
Security Council already has imposed enforcement measures on the aggressor. 
Therefore, the ICC may not be inclined to rule against the Council on aggression, even 
if it had the power to do so. However, it may engage in an expressive form of review. 
 
The issue of submitting the ICC under the decision-making powers of the Security 
Council relates to a broader question of whether the Security Council’s powers under 
the Charter are legitimate in the world of today. The Security Council no longer 
represents the membership of the UN geographically or politically. Some of the 
permanent members no longer are the global players as they were in 1945 and new 
powers have emerged, such as Japan, Germany, India and Brazil.462 The Council also 
has a tendency to dress itself in a legal robe, without changing its procedure to fit the 
standards of due process.463  A revision of the Security Council’s membership or 
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mandate has been called for, the former is considered to be slightly more realistic than 
the latter.464  
 
Judicial review of Security Council decisions may question the primacy of the Security 
Council and perhaps even the whole UN system of collective security.465 It has been 
argued that the ICC reviewing a Security Council determination on aggression could 
counterbalance Security Council’s monopoly on aggression.466 Perhaps this could 
impose some form of legitimacy on the Security Council? Some consider that the 
failures of the Security Council cannot and should not be changed by international 
criminal law or the Rome Statute.467 Only two of the permanent five members are States 
Parties to the Rome Statute468 and some emerging and regional powers have not ratified 
it either.469  An implicit diminution of the Security Council’s powers in the Rome 
Statute could alienate the permanent three and their allies further away from the ICC.470 
Alvarez writes that courts have a task of legitimizing the Security Council, specifically 
when they confirm or agree with its decisions. 471 This is the way in which the court 
speaks to the international community and strengthens its trust in international 
institutions.472 However, the opposite may also be Stated. A party that is not supportive 
or trustful of the Security Council’s decision, upheld by the court, may find that it 
creates distrust in the system.  
 
It should also be remembered that no matter how much one questions the legitimacy of 
the Security Council or the system of collective security, the ICC was still created 
within that structure. The preamble to the Rome Statute reaffirms the ‘Purposes and 
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Principles of the Charter of the United Nations’ and the Security Council’s authority 
under Chapter VII is part of that architecture.473  Perhaps it is not a question about 
challenging the Security Council’s role as keeper of the peace but a question of 
reforming the Council and making the system work better.474 One of the reasons for 
certain States opposing a binding decision by the Security Council is the veto-power of 
the permanent members. It has been argued that the powers of the permanent members 
of the Security Council to veto a decision on aggression would place their nationals 
above the law and would be contradictory to international law.475 Goodrich suggested 
many years ago that the permanent members should recognise and embrace the power 
of the Security Council in their cooperation for the common interest of global 
security.476 During the negotiations on the crime of aggression an innovative proposal 
by Blokker reconnected with this spirit in suggesting that the permanent members 
should agree to not use their veto in a case concerning aggression.477   
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose and aim of this study is to examine the impact of the Rome Statute 
amendments on aggression on the relationship between the International Criminal 
Court and the Security Council and whether as a result of these provisions the ICC may 
exercise some form of judicial review of Security Council decisions. Chapter one of 
this study provided an introduction to the theme, purpose, and structure of this study. 
Chapter two provided for the legal framework relevant for this study. The UN Charter 
the Security Council has a primary, but not exclusive role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security. It may determine the existence of acts of aggression 
under Chapter VII and such decisions are binding upon the Member States of the United 
Nations under Articles 25 and 103 of the Charter. The Security Council’s determination 
on aggression is inherently political and its practice on aggression is divergent. The 
definitions of aggression within the UN system and the definition of a crime of 
aggression in the Rome Statute are similar, but not identical, which may ultimately have 
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an impact on the use of force of States. The provisions agreed upon at the Review 
Conference for the purposes of the ICC’s specific jurisdiction over crime of aggression 
provide for a role for the United Nations Security Council to engage in determining the 
existence of an act of aggression, but the ICC is not bound by the determination. This 
role is reasonable, taking into consideration that there is an established, complex 
relationship between the ICC and the United Nations, in particular with the Security 
Council. 
 
Chapter three examined the question of judicial review of Security Council decisions 
and practice on international courts on the matter. It noted that there is a spectre of 
different forms of judicial review ranging from the strictest form which entails a 
decision on the illegality of an executive decision to the opposite form wherein judicial 
review is understood as an institutional dialogue between an executive organ and a 
court. The Chapter provided a brief overview of relevant case-law from the 
International Court of Justice and the ad hoc international criminal tribunals. It was 
concluded that while international courts have engaged in different forms of judicial 
review none of them have been explicitly empowered with the right to review Security 
Council decisions in any treaty and none of them have considered a Security Council 
decision unlawful. The ICJ has reviewed resolutions in accordance with its powers to 
interpret the UN Charter, although to date, it has not explicitly claimed a right to do so 
routinely. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Yugoslavia ruled that it was 
within its inherent jurisdiction to examine the legality of its establishment and therefore 
also the resolution establishing the ICTY, while the Special Tribunal for Lebanon ruled 
that it has no power to review resolutions by the Security Council. While the European 
Court of Justice certainly has no power to judicially review Security Council pursuant 
to the UN Charter, its judgment pushed the Security Council to change its practices on 
sanctions. None of these courts have the same, direct jurisdictional relationship with 
the Security Council as the International Criminal Court now has. 
 
Chapter four examined whether the new jurisdictional relationship between these 
institutions allow or empower judicial review by the ICC of Security Council decisions 
and presented the conclusions of this study. It was noted that since the Security Council 
and the ICC are innately different institutions and bound by different rules they could 
arrive at different conclusions when determining the existence of an act of aggression 
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for their own purposes. This could lead to conflicting obligations for States, which are 
from the outset bound by the primacy of the Charter in accordance with Article 103. 
The chapter also examined the objective and intent of the drafters of the Rome Statute 
and the amendments on the crime of aggression and noted that while the drafters had  
considered whether the ICC would be bound by a Security Council determination of 
aggression, it seems that the drafters did not consider whether the amendments would 
have the impact that the International Criminal Court would be empowered to review 
Security Council resolutions. However, none of the statutes or of the international 
courts that have engaged in judicial review in practice have provided for that option. 
On the contrary, the notion of judicial review was abandoned by the drafters of the UN 
Charter. Still, the International Court of Justice has engaged in review. Similarly, while 
practice by the international criminal tribunals form some of the most important case 
law on the topic, their statutes do not empower them with judicial review. In fact, 
judicial review in international law is something that has emerged through practice and 
it is anticipated that practice will also form the future of international judicial review.  
 
 
